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OUTING PRIVACY
Scott Skinner-Thompson
ABSTRACT—The government regularly outs information concerning
people’s sexuality, gender identity, and HIV status. Notwithstanding the
implications of such outings, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether
the Constitution contains a right to informational privacy—a right to limit
the government’s ability to collect and disseminate personal information.
This Article probes informational privacy theory and jurisprudence to
better understand the judiciary’s reluctance to fully embrace a
constitutional right to informational privacy. The Article argues that while
existing scholarly theories of informational privacy encourage us to broadly
imagine the right and its possibilities, often focusing on informational
privacy’s ability to promote individual dignity and autonomy, there is a
disconnect when courts attempt to translate those theories into workable
doctrine. The extant theories are products of Fourth Amendment and
decisional privacy law, and bear a more attenuated relationship to
informational privacy problems, hindering recognition of the right.
This Article reorients and hones the focus of the purported
informational privacy right toward what the Due Process Clause suggests
as the right’s two principal and more concrete values: preventing intimate
information from serving as the basis for potential discrimination and
creating space for the formation of political thought. By so doing, not only
is a more precise theory of informational privacy constructed, but
instrumentally (and perhaps most importantly), courts will be more apt to
recognize a constitutional informational privacy right thereby better
insulating individuals from discrimination or marginalization.
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INTRODUCTION
A police officer approaches two teenage boys in a parked car. During
questioning, the boys allegedly admit they were there to have sex together.
The officer threatens that if one of the boys does not tell his grandfather
that he is gay, the officer will tell the grandfather. After his release from
custody, the boy kills himself.1
A transgender individual seeks to change the gender marker on a
government-issued identification—identification that all individuals are
required by law to show potential employers.2 To obtain an accurate ID, the

1

Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2000).
Verification of Identity and Employment Authorization, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2015); U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-9, EMPLOYMENT
ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-9.pdf [http://perma.cc/
R5MM-BQQR].
2

160

SKINNER-THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2015 11:07 AM

110:159 (2015)

Outing Privacy

state requires the person to publicly profess whether they have had gender
confirmation surgery.3
Litigants request that a government report detailing certain
individuals’ extreme political and religious views be publicly produced.4
Does our Constitution contain solutions to pressing informational
privacy problems such as these, which often involve the forced outing of
individuals’ sexuality, gender identity, HIV status, and political beliefs by
the government? Are there constitutional limits on the ability of the
government to collect and disseminate our personal information (so-called
informational privacy)? Despite that this year marks the fiftieth anniversary
of Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Supreme Court first acknowledged
the right to decisional privacy,5 neither scholars nor the Court have
definitively resolved these questions or outlined the contours of a workable
right to constitutional informational privacy.6 This Article attempts to fill
that void. In so doing, the Article examines both informational privacy
theory and jurisprudence to better understand why the judiciary has been
reluctant to fully embrace a robust constitutional right to informational
privacy.
While prevailing theories of informational privacy beneficially
encourage us to broadly imagine the right and its possibilities, often
focusing on informational privacy’s ability to promote individual dignity
(the value most closely associated with the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on intrusive searches) and autonomy (the value directly
safeguarded by decisional privacy protections), there is a disconnect when
courts attempt to translate these theories into feasible doctrine. This
Article’s ambition is to hone extant theories of informational privacy and
articulate a conceptual, theoretical framework that more precisely captures
informational privacy’s distinct, perhaps more modest, normative values. In
addition to more accurately identifying the values underlying an
informational privacy right, this Article’s reconstituted theory of
3 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
AND REGULATIONS § 21(d) (1992).

CONTROL & PREVENTION, MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT

4

ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1990).
“Decisional privacy” refers to the right recognized in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court acknowledged that individuals have the ability to
control certain fundamental decisions. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)
(distinguishing decisional privacy from informational privacy—“the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters”).
6 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 953, 954, 986 (2012) (recognizing that the “law struggles to define the metes and bounds of
the claimed constitutional right” to informational privacy and, in response, arguing that we “need not
invent” an informational privacy right and instead should simply view other established constitutional
rights through the lens of privacy).
5
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constitutional informational privacy will translate more fluidly into a
coherent doctrinal framework likely to find judicial purchase.
In short, alongside a belief that informational privacy advances
individual dignity and autonomy, this Article suggests that informational
privacy’s two principal, more narrow and concrete values are creating
space for the formation and nurturing of political thought and preventing
intimate, personal information from serving as the basis of potential
discrimination.7 So conceived, the Article also demonstrates that the proper
test for evaluating informational privacy claims that implicate those two
interests is one of heightened or strict scrutiny.8 Normatively, it is in part
because intimate and political information tend, by their nature, to involve
a higher likelihood of downstream consequences (such as employment
discrimination resulting from the disclosed intimate information or
marginalization caused by the monitoring of political thought) that they are
entitled to special protection relative to other forms of information.
Doctrinally, strict scrutiny is warranted because political thought and
intimate information are closely related to already-recognized fundamental
rights such as marital privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom of association.
The need for the development of a narrow but exacting informational
privacy framework is acute. In addition to privacy concerns raised by
government programs such as the National Security Agency’s (NSA)
telephone metadata surveillance regime,9 informational privacy is
7 By “intimate information” I mean, for example, sexual, medical, or mental health information.
“Political thought” includes information arguably pertaining to countermajoritarian viewpoints. There
may be a concern that these examples are insufficient and that a more fixed meaning of “intimate”
information is necessary, lest this Article’s categorical approach morph into the less contained dignity–
autonomy approach that I critique. While attune to this concern, it is my sense, as Tom Gerety has
explained, that intimacy actually “has a quite certain and quite exact core of meaning or application.”
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 282 n.175 (1977). That is, society
and courts have a general sense of what counts as intimate information—and it is a limited universe, as
the following discussion of case law highlights. For present purposes, rather than prescribe a definitive,
fixed set of what constitutes intimate information, it is enough to provide several examples (sexual,
medical, mental health) that capture the majority of what constitutes intimate information, and let the
“content of the intimacies of identity . . . be worked out case-by-case.” Id. at 281. The presence of
downstream consequences also has a limiting effect on what will be entitled to heightened protection.
8 This is in contrast to the less muscular balancing test advocated by many scholars and employed
by several courts. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The
Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479,
504, 509 (1990) (noting courts’ movement toward a test that balances interests and away from a strict
preferred rights analysis, and then embracing that approach); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134
(5th Cir. 1978) (employing balancing test to resolve informational privacy claim).
9 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2013) (the NSA’s metadata
surveillance program captures the phone numbers used to make and receive calls, when the calls took
place, and how long the calls lasted, but, according to the government, does not include the content of
the calls or identities of the callers), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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threatened by a host of seemingly routine government actions, including
ministerial bureaucratic requirements. Surgery requirements to change the
gender marker on a government ID is one important example.
Notwithstanding that need, the Supreme Court has failed to definitively
recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy in favor of
reluctantly assuming (without deciding) that such a right exists on three
occasions, most recently in 2011.10 As Justice Scalia bemoaned, the Court
has applied “a constitutional informational privacy standard without giving
a clue as to the rule of law it is applying . . . . provid[ing] no guidance
whatsoever for lower courts.”11 The Court has thereby added to the
conceptual confusion regarding the scope of an informational privacy right
and left lower courts and litigants grappling to determine how to enforce
the right—should it exist at all.12
In endeavoring to remedy the persistent confusion and craft a rigorous
framework for evaluating constitutional informational privacy claims by
giving priority to claims infringing on intimate information or political
thought, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I analyzes scholarship regarding the theoretical underpinnings of
an informational privacy right (and privacy generally). Part I concludes that
while this scholarship greatly advances our understanding of privacy’s
overarching value—by framing informational privacy in terms of dignity,
autonomy, and existing Fourth Amendment and decisional privacy
protections—predominant theories of informational privacy are often
imprecise and fail to identify the more concrete harms implicated by
informational privacy claims, contributing to the judicial confusion
scrutinized in Part II.13 For instance, while courts recognize that personal
dignity is implicated by a traditional police search of someone’s home,
because informational privacy claims often lack the same visceral
intrusiveness, courts struggle to conclude that a plaintiff’s dignity interest is
threatened. Throughout both Parts I and II, the Article shows how a theory
of informational privacy reoriented toward intimate information and

10 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“We assume, without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon [i.e., informational
privacy].”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (discussing the same privacy
right); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (same).
11 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
12 See id. at 756 n.9 (majority opinion) (“State and lower federal courts have offered a number of
different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years.”).
13 See, e.g., J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (the Framers “cannot have
intended that the federal courts become involved in an inquiry nearly as broad—balancing almost every
act of government, both state and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable, and
all-encompassing as individual privacy”).
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political thought avoids these pitfalls and is more likely to be adopted by
courts because these interests are more directly served by informational
privacy.
Part III explains why a robust constitutional informational privacy
framework is socially imperative. Part IV then provides constitutional
support for a strict scrutiny framework that gives deference to privacy
claims that implicate intimate information and political thought. These
categories, intimate information and political thought, are isolated and
supported by a combination of doctrinal and normative judicial
undercurrents. That is, in addition to bearing a close relationship to
fundamental rights already recognized by courts under the Due Process
Clause14 and the First Amendment of the Constitution,15 these two
categories track and reflect judicial discourse, suggesting that intimate
information and political thought are (or at least ought to be) entitled to
special constitutional protection. Until this time, in part because of the
theoretical emphasis on dignity, autonomy, and “intrusion,” courts have
lacked a coherent doctrinal framework to animate their normative intuition
regarding the importance of intimate information and political thought.
This Article provides courts, government actors, litigants, and other
scholars a blueprint for the development of an enforceable informational
privacy cause of action—one that cannot be dismissed as overly broad or
bearing little connection to the purported interests advanced by the right. In
this way, we can out a right to informational privacy.16
I.

REORIENTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY THEORY

Legal scholarship is rich with attempts to craft comprehensive theories
or definitions of privacy. Positively, these attempts have challenged courts

14 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
16 Thirty-five years ago, Ruth Gavison offered a powerful explanation of the need for an explicit
legal commitment to a freestanding right to privacy, including informational privacy. See Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE. L.J. 421 (1980). Gavison explained that reductionist attempts
to deny the utility of privacy as a legal concept by relying on the law’s heretofore failure to recognize
such a concept was, in essence, tautological. See id. at 460–61. Once privacy was explicitly
acknowledged, as opposed to implicitly informing other rights, the right would gain texture and
validation because privacy claimants would come out of the closet, no longer needing to couch their
privacy claims in terms of other, less fitting rights. See id. at 456–58. In some ways, this Article is a
response to Gavison’s call for an “explicit commitment” within the context of American constitutional
law. See id. at 459.
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to expansively envision what role the “right to privacy” plays in a
democratic society and to identify privacy’s many values.17 But as a
consequence, by broadly and flexibly defining informational privacy as
promoting dignity and autonomy, scholarship has perhaps buried
informational privacy’s more nuanced contributions to the constitutional
fabric and unintentionally reinforced the judicial perception that
informational privacy rights are undefinable and unenforceable.18 The
emphasis on dignity and autonomy within the informational privacy
context has distracted courts from informational privacy’s more limited
underlying interests—the protection of intimate information and political
thought.19
A. Dignity
Many have focused on privacy’s ability to protect individuals from
intrusion into information not known to others, thereby protecting an
individual’s dignity.20 A dignity theory of informational privacy posits that
the intrusion itself is an inherent harm to the individual, regardless of the
subject matter of the information intruded upon or any consequent,

17 As then-Justice Rehnquist nicely described it, “[t]he concept of ‘privacy’ can be a coat of many
colors, and quite differing kinds of rights to ‘privacy’ have been recognized in the law.” Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 546 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18 See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (doubting a right to informational
privacy because plaintiffs “do not pinpoint the source of the right or identify its contours”); DeSanti,
653 F.2d at 1089 (concluding that absent a framework, “[a]nalytically we are unable to see how such a
constitutional right of privacy can be restricted to anything less than the general ‘right to be let alone’”
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
For different reasons, Julie Cohen has also recently argued that privacy’s “bad reputation has deep
roots in privacy theory.” See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906
(2013). For Cohen, privacy should not be viewed exclusively as rooted in liberal individualism, but is
better understood as part of a larger, social protection safeguarding informed citizenship. Id. So
conceptualizing privacy will have real benefit in many contexts (and Cohen’s formulation is consistent
with this Article’s conclusion that political information is entitled to heightened protection). But for
privacy to have practical meaning in restraining government in the constitutional context, an individual
rights focus is probably inescapable. Put differently, while privacy may have broader social value,
privacy qua individual right is the enforcement mechanism that can lead to on-the-ground
implementation of the right.
19 Of course, others have also suggested that to varying degrees both intimacy and political thought
deserve special privacy protections. See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 7, at 236 (arguing that privacy ought to
be defined as autonomy over “the intimacies of personal identity”); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and
the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269–70 (1983) (suggesting that privacy be understood as “facts
about a person which most individuals in a given society at a given time do not want widely known
about themselves” (footnote omitted)). My contribution is to explain how in the constitutional context
the prevailing focus on autonomy and dignity has overshadowed the importance of these two categories,
and outline how focusing or recentering on these two categories can help a constitutional right to
informational privacy garner more widespread judicial acceptance and a stronger doctrinal foothold.
20 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 85 (2008) (noting that several scholars focus
on privacy’s intrinsic, nonconsequentialist value).
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downstream impacts from the intrusion.21 Without dismissing the
relationship between informational privacy and dignity, dignity is, by itself,
an insufficient organizing principle for a workable informational privacy
cause of action.22 And defining a broad concept such as privacy in terms of
an equally if not more malleable concept such as dignity does little to aid
courts in their attempts to construct an enforceable informational privacy
right.23
The scholarly focus on informational privacy’s connection to dignity
emerged almost as soon as privacy began to be theorized as an American
jurisprudential right. In their oft-analyzed article, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis advocated for a common law right to informational privacy.24
Warren and Brandeis were attempting to demonstrate that a common law
right to informational privacy had a tradition in intellectual property torts
(such as defamation and copyright) but that privacy causes of action should
not be limited to claims implicating property rights. For example, their
right to privacy was not restricted to intrusions into literary compositions
(which have a property value), but would extend to personal letters (which

21 See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Posser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964).
22 This is not to suggest that intimate information and political thought are completely disassociated
from dignity and autonomy. From a certain perspective, intimate and political information are examples
of dignity and autonomy at their zenith. Nor is it to suggest that the multifaceted concept of dignity
plays no role in helping to understand privacy’s societal value, other provisions of the Constitution, or
our broader social obligations. Certainly it does. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749, 792 (2011) (noting that equality and liberty function together to advance
an overarching value in dignity); Kwame Anthony Appiah, Dignity and Global Duty, 90 B.U. L. REV.
661, 674–75 (2010) (sustaining dignity for all should be the aim of global institutions and aiding such
institutions helps us fulfill our personal responsibility to others’ dignity); Jeremy Waldron, 2009 Oliver
Wendell Holmes Lectures, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596,
1612–13 (2010) (discussing that the protection of individual dignity forms a suitable foundation for
regulation of hate speech denigrating minority groups). Rather, in terms of informational privacy
doctrine and a workable cause of action, dignity (as the harm caused by intrusion) and autonomy are
imprecise and lack judicial cachet because informational privacy problems often do not directly
implicate dignitary or autonomy concerns. Cf. Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 34, 53–54 (1967) (commenting that privacy scholars frequently fail to bridge the gap between
legal theory and a workable right).
23 SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 39 (“[P]rivacy conceptions that are too broad fail to provide much
guidance; they are often empty of meaning and have little to contribute to the resolution of concrete
problems.”).
24 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1890); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J.
643, 644 (2007) (“there has been minimal judicial protection for informational privacy”
notwithstanding that it was “the primary focus of Brandeis and Warren”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV 737, 745 n.47 (1989) (observing that Brandeis’s view of privacy could
potentially be viewed as “limited exclusively to the informational sense”).
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often do not).25 To expand the right to privacy beyond a mere property
right, Warren and Brandeis broadly conceived of the right as protecting the
“immunity of the person” and the “right to one’s personality.”26 They
painted the right to privacy as focused on invasions into one’s dignity.27
Because Warren and Brandeis broadly framed informational privacy
as protecting one’s dignity in part to avoid limiting it to property claims, it
is understandable that, to a degree, we have lost track of the fact that
Warren and Brandeis did not view all privacy invasions equally as
problematic regardless of subject matter. According to several accounts, the
principal motivating factor for the article was the publication of intimate
details regarding Samuel Warren’s family.28 At the outset of their article,
Warren and Brandeis specifically lamented, “the details of sexual relations
are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.”29 However, in
their effort to persuade as to the importance of a right to informational
privacy and extrapolate that right from existing property-centric common
law, they broadly characterized the right as being instrumental to the
preservation of human dignity. The importance of certain paramount
categories of information has been lost, or at least glossed over.
The scholarly focus on dignity as the underlying value of an
informational privacy right continued from there. In his important 1964
article, Edward Bloustein argued that the “gist of the wrong in the intrusion
cases” (that is, Fourth Amendment search cases) is “a blow to human
dignity, an assault on human personality.”30 For Bloustein, “[e]aves25 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 205 (“The principle which protects personal writings and
all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in
any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.”).
26 Id. at 207.
27 See also id. at 196 (detailing the how invasions of privacy “belittle[]” one’s dignity); David A.J.
Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 973–74 (1979) (Brandeis’s conception of
information privacy had a “deep connection with personal dignity”); Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 752
(Brandeis and Warren viewed the right to informational privacy as rooted in dignity and personhood
theories of privacy); Turkington, supra note 8, at 484 (“The core theoretical concepts and assumptions
employed in the [Warren and Brandeis] article view privacy as a condition and right that is essentially
tied to human dignity . . . .”).
28 See Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering
the Press Coverage that Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 59–60; Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO.
L.J. 123, 128 (2007) (“[T]he private papers of the two men suggest that perceived press invasions into
the ‘social privacy’ of [Boston] Brahmin families like the Warrens prompted Warren to enlist his friend
Brandeis in the project.”).
29 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196. Despite highlighting certain categories of information
as particularly concerning, to the extent arguably banal information was disseminated widely, Warren
and Brandeis still viewed the dissemination as potentially problematic. Id. (“Even gossip apparently
harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil.”).
30 Bloustein, supra note 21, at 974.
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dropping and wiretapping, unwanted entry into another’s home, may be the
occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment but that is not what
makes these acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful because they are
demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they cause
emotional trauma.”31 But Bloustein went even further, contending that
human dignity was also the key interest at stake in instances where private
information was disseminated publicly.32
Philosopher Stanley Benn also argued that overall conceptions of and
protections for privacy should “be grounded on the more general principle
of respect for persons.”33 Benn believed that framing privacy as key to
human dignity gave voice to society’s general discomfort with being
observed.34 At the same time, Benn argued that a dignity conception of
privacy helped preserve individual autonomy that would be curtailed and
chilled by widespread observation.35 In his analysis of what he labeled “the
emerging unencumbered constitutional right to informational privacy,”
Richard Turkington, too, saw the right as rooted in “the human dignity
respect for persons theory of privacy.”36 Turkington was explicit in noting
that the right to informational privacy had jurisprudential roots in the
Fourth Amendment, though he believed informational privacy rights
extended beyond the narrow government actions classified as “searches”
under the Fourth Amendment.37
While not necessarily focused specifically on informational privacy,
other scholars have conceived of privacy’s virtues in even more expansive
terms than the “mere” protection of dignity.38 For example, David A.J.
31

Id.
Id. at 982 (“Physical intrusion upon a private life and publicity concerning intimate affairs are
simply two different ways of affronting individuality and human dignity. The difference is only in the
means used to threaten the protected interest.”); see also ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 199, 203–04 (1971) (suggesting that the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against intrusion may “give rise to a constitutional right to withhold personal
information”).
33 Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1, 8 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
34 Id. at 6, 11.
35 Id. at 26.
36 Turkington, supra note 8, at 481, 490.
37 Id. at 494, 502; see also Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV.
311, 316–18 (2013) (suggesting that privacy is violated when there is an intrusion on both spatial and
bodily intimacy, thereby advancing the concept of intimacy but also perpetuating the focus on physical
intrusions).
38 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“In general it is my thesis that in
developed social contexts love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and accord to
each other a certain measure of privacy.”).
32
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Richards has made a moving case that at stake in the right to privacy “is
nothing less than the basic moral vision of persons as having human rights:
that is, as autonomous and entitled to equal concern and respect.”39
While envisioning a right to informational privacy as protecting
human dignity is a useful conceptual tool and helps us understand how
privacy works with other constitutional rights to create a patchwork of
protections for individual liberty and restrained government, it fails to
pinpoint informational privacy’s specific normative value and distinguish
informational privacy from other constitutional values and rights (such as
the Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure and Due
Process protections for decisional privacy). Moreover, in practice and as
discussed more fully in Part II, at times dignity appears of limited value to
courts in actually crafting an enforceable constitutional informational
privacy right.40
A dignity theory of privacy makes more sense, and is palatable to
American courts, in situations where the state exercises its police power to
conduct an intrusive search without an individual’s permission.41 In such
instances where the state’s agents physically or remotely invade a person’s
body or property, a person’s dignity is obviously implicated and the Fourth
Amendment presumably governs and protects that dignity interest.42 A
dignity theory of privacy is also more intuitive where the state is
intervening directly to forbid, or even merely unduly burden, a woman’s
ability to make an independent choice regarding whether to continue with a
39

David A.J. Richards, supra note 27, at 975.
Infra Part II; see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 10, 108 (2010) (appeals to “higher-order values” in defense of privacy
often fail to resolve conflicts between privacy and other societal interests); Gerety, supra note 7, at 234
(“A legal concept will do us little good if it expands like a gas to fill up the available space.”).
41 As James Whitman observed, “the really easy cases in the American tradition are the ones
involving, or resembling, criminal investigations” and that one “can count on Americans to see privacy
violations . . . where the issue can be somehow analogized to penetration into the home, or sometimes
the body.” James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1215 (2004). Given that tradition, our preoccupation with framing informational
privacy questions as governmental intrusions is not surprising. See also SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 188
(“Courts and legislatures respond well to more traditional privacy problems, such as intrusions that are
physical in nature, disclosures of deep secrets, or distortion. This is due, in part, to the fact that these
problems track traditional conceptions of privacy.”); cf. NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 93–95
(describing the role of the Cold War, antitotalitarianism, and the public/private dichotomy as shaping
our conception of privacy as one designed to prevent government intrusion).
42 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The [Fourth] Amendment
guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by
officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979
(2013) (holding that a cheek swab constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but that it did not
significantly “increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of arrest”).
40
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pregnancy.43 These points are vividly illustrated by the contrasting opinions
in Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Supreme Court struck down state bans
on same-sex marriage.44 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the
majority’s apparent reliance on “right of privacy” precedent (such as
Griswold) as irrelevant to the issue of same-sex marriage because those
cases involved intrusions into people’s lives and bedrooms.45 Conversely,
the majority found those cases potent in large part because of their
relationship to intimate activity, demonstrating the salience of intimacy, as
detailed more fully in Section IV.A.46
But in the informational privacy context, many times there is no
forced intrusion or covert invasion at all, and the information is
“voluntarily” provided to the state.47 For example, in the Supreme Court’s
most recent case addressing constitutional informational privacy, NASA v.
Nelson, the Court held that no constitutional right to informational privacy
was violated where government contractors were required to fill out an
employment questionnaire that included questions about, inter alia, drug
treatment and counseling.48 In such questionnaire situations, the
relationship between dignity and the asserted privacy claim is more
difficult to grasp. The “intrusion” itself is less graphic. Because
informational claims generally involve less visceral invasions, courts are
searching for a harm other than the purported harm to human dignity.49
43 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1694 (2008) (arguing that dignity is the motivating value behind
the Supreme Court’s undue burden test, “which allows government to regulate abortion to demonstrate
respect for the dignity of human life so long as such regulation also demonstrates respect for the dignity
of women”).
44 Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571 and 14–574, slip op. at 28 (U.S. June 26,
2015).
45 Id. at 17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and sodomy,
the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion.”). As discussed below, the extent to
which Griswold actually is an intrusion case is debatable. Infra note 49.
46 Id. at 10 (majority opinion) (holding that Due Process “liberties extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs”). While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion discusses both autonomy and dignity,
which is only proper in the context of evaluating limits on individuals’ freedom to marry, even in the
marriage context, the concepts of autonomy and dignity are given teeth and limits through reliance on
intimacy. Nor was Justice Kennedy referring to dignity in the sense of the harm caused by an intrusion.
47 Of course, to the extent the information is provided as part of, for example, a job application
requirement, there is at least a degree of compulsion in providing the information.
48 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
118 F.3d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (mere collection of information regarding drug use, mental health,
and financial stability via employee questionnaires did not violate right to informational privacy);
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 120 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
49 Gerety, supra note 7, at 252 n.66 (dignity serves “no indispensable purpose” in privacy cases).
Griswold itself illustrates the outsized role that intrusion and dignity have played in analyzing
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To summarize, because of the historical focus on the Fourth
Amendment and government intrusions, scholars and litigants have at times
emphasized intrusion and its threat to dignity. That is, they have often been
attempting to make informational claims sound in the Fourth Amendment.50
The constitutional right to informational privacy, if it is to mean something
different than or in addition to the Fourth Amendment, is more properly
and specifically oriented toward the threat of government dissemination
and (to a lesser degree) collection of intimate information and nascent
political thought and the social harms that flow from such collection and
dissemination.51
B. Autonomy
Alongside the focus on intrusions and dignity—closely associated
with Fourth Amendment doctrine—privacy scholars have also attempted to
justify the right to informational privacy by suggesting that it advances
personal autonomy. In this way, scholars have attempted to draw a
proximate relationship between informational privacy and the more wellestablished (but under attack) right to decisional privacy, which directly
implicates the right to make autonomous decisions and be left alone. The
right to decisional privacy, as embodied in cases such as Loving v.
Virginia,52 Eisenstadt v. Baird,53 and Roe v. Wade,54 provides that there are
informational privacy claims. Notwithstanding that the police in Griswold never actually intruded into
the bedrooms of any couples to determine if contraception was being used (the plaintiffs were doctors
who prescribed contraception), the Court relied on the specter of such an intrusion to bolster its holding.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 650
(Griswold’s “focus on intrusion was misplaced because the case did not involve that at all; no one’s
bedroom or house had been searched”); Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project,
94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1095 (2006) (suggesting that Griswold contains a “substantial informational
component”).
50 David Sklansky has recently described the mirror of the trend I document. See David Alan
Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2014). According to Sklansky, informational privacy rhetoric has
begun to bleed into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, gradually eroding the Fourth Amendment’s
historic bite. Id.
51 Infra Part IV. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, while the constitutional informational
privacy right envisioned by this Article is primarily concerned with government dissemination of
intimate and political information (and the downstream social consequences of that dissemination), the
right could still implicate and invalidate government collection efforts where the government action is
not justified by a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to prevent unnecessary
dissemination. In other words, while dissemination is the focus, collection is almost always an
antecedent action to dissemination, and thus falls within the ambit of government action regulated by a
constitutional informational privacy right. By focusing on the downstream harms of dissemination, this
Article’s approach also has the benefit of avoiding the red herring debate over whether certain
information is nonactionable because it is purportedly “voluntarily” provided to the government via an
answer to a questionnaire (as opposed to forcibly extracted by a “search”).
52 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
53 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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certain areas of life so fundamentally important and private that the
government may not, absent satisfying a heightened level of scrutiny,
infringe or burden an individual’s autonomy or freedom to make those
decisions. Examples include the rights to marry,55 use contraception,56 and
have an abortion.57 But, as with dignity, informational privacy’s ability to
promote autonomy of decision making over areas of such fundamental
importance is often indirect, providing courts a weak theoretical foundation
for development of an informational privacy right.
In Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin argued that one of privacy’s
key functions was to promote individual freedom and, correspondingly,
autonomy.58 Pursuant to Westin’s framing, even casual intrusions into one’s
privacy could threaten an individual’s autonomy—Westin’s informational
privacy right was content neutral.59 Philosopher Elizabeth Beardsley argued
that the norm of privacy was animated by both a concern for individual
autonomy and selective disclosure (that is, informational privacy).60 But
Beardsley saw “no alternative to justifying the norm of selective disclosure
directly in terms of the norm of autonomy, and to recognizing the latter as
an ultimate moral principle, standing on its own feet.”61 While Beardsley
viewed informational privacy as “the conceptual core of the norm of
privacy,” the norm of autonomy gives privacy its “moral rationale.”62
Relatedly, Francis Chlapowski has argued that “[i]nformational
privacy should be protected under the right to privacy because it is an

54

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free [people].”).
56 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
57 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
58 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967) (“The most serious threat to the
individual’s autonomy is the possibility that someone may penetrate the inner zone and learn [their]
ultimate secrets, either by physical or psychological means. This deliberate penetration of the
individual’s protective shell, [their] psychological armor, would leave [them] naked to ridicule and
shame and would put [them] under the control of those who knew [their] secrets.”).
59 See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 23 (1997) (observing that under
Westin’s conception, “[i]nformation privacy does not depend on the content or merit of the information
at issue” and has an “inherent neutrality”).
60 Elizabeth L. Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in NOMOS XIII:
PRIVACY, supra note 33, at 56, 56.
61 Id. at 70.
62 Id.; see also VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 86 (1991) (urging that privacy’s true value is in fostering autonomy).
55
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element of personhood, integral to an individual’s identity.”63 To
Chlapowski, informational privacy rights are rooted in personhood because
“the state, by disclosing personal information, deprives the individual of
the opportunity to ‘define’ herself.”64 Although less focused on an
individualistic conception of autonomy, Julie Cohen has also, at times,
advanced an autonomy-focused vision of informational privacy, suggesting
that such a theory of informational privacy aids in helping understand
informational privacy’s true value in providing space for a dynamic
citizenship.65 According to Cohen, “[a] protected zone of informational
autonomy is valuable, in short, precisely because it reminds us what we
cannot measure.”66 Neil Richards, too, has noted the trend among
information privacy scholars of focusing on informational privacy’s
relationship to autonomy.67
While informational privacy no doubt enhances individual autonomy
at least at the abstract level, the difficulty of an autonomy-focused theory at
the lower level of doctrine is that it often involves too many causal steps
between the information accessed or disseminated and the harm to
autonomy.68 Courts struggle to understand how collection or dissemination
of certain information directly infringes on one’s ability to make
independent decisions.69 Moreover, even if one were able to draw a more
63 Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 133, 154 (1991).
64 Id. As Helen Nissenbaum has observed, the relationship between privacy and autonomy has been
conceptualized in at least three different ways: (1) privacy as autonomy or control over the information
itself, (2) privacy as facilitating an environment where individual autonomy is likely to flourish, and (3)
privacy as creating space for the ability to actually follow through on autonomous decisions.
NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 81–82.
65 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1423–25 (2000).
66 Id. at 1428; see also Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra
note 33, at 169, 173–74, 181 (informational privacy is desirable because it permits individual selfdetermination over how one appears and to whom, concluding that “an offense to privacy is an offense
to autonomy”); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983) (autonomy includes the right to decide “what personal
information to disclose,” or conceal, from others); Fried, supra note 38, at 483 (“Privacy, thus, is
control over knowledge about oneself.”); Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2007) (favoring a “control-based definition of privacy” that
affords individuals the space to develop, “while maintaining autonomy over the course and direction of
one’s life”). To the extent that some of the “privacy as autonomy” theorists focus on “personhood,”
there is some overlap with those whom I characterize as dignity theorists. The line between dignity and
autonomy is not always a bright one.
67 Richards, supra note 49, at 1102–03; see also Gerety, supra note 7, at 236 (defining privacy as
“autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity”).
68 See infra Section II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s difficulty in Nelson understanding how
an informational questionnaire directly infringes one’s autonomy).
69 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977) (rejecting privacy claim because law at
issue did not directly infringe on plaintiffs’ ability to take medication they desired). As Helen
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direct line between access to private information and its effect on
decisionmaking, framing the harm in terms of self-creation or selfrealization is too ethereal and is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to
weigh against the government’s purported interest in the information.70
Jed Rubenfeld has offered a similar critique of the autonomy theory of
privacy.71 For Rubenfeld, autonomy theories of privacy lack cogency (even
in the decisional privacy context, which is his focus) because of their
inability to line draw—that is, virtually every law impacts one’s ability to
self-actualize.72 But Rubenfeld’s solution is arguably no less boundless. He
suggests that instead of construing privacy as carving out areas where the
government may not restrict our activity, it is best to view privacy as
limiting the government’s totalitarian power to mandate conformity.73 For
Rubenfeld, antiabortion laws should be viewed as problematic because
they, in effect, force women to be mothers.74 But from whichever angle the
government’s power is viewed (positive or negative), Rubenfeld’s
modified, antitotalitarian theory requires just as many (if not more) causal
steps because the plaintiff would need to show not just that they are being
prevented from doing some action via the information disclosure, but
would also need to demonstrate that the disclosure is forcing them to be
something they would prefer not to become (in the abortion context, to
become a mother). As such, while informational privacy is not Rubenfeld’s
principal focus, the antitotalitarianism gloss would not get us closer to a
workable right to informational privacy.
To recapitulate, some privacy scholars have attempted to justify
informational privacy by suggesting it advances individual autonomy. The
prominent role of decisional privacy among constitutional jurisprudence
seems to have bled into scholarly analysis regarding the role of

Nissenbaum has argued, for a theory of privacy to be “plausible” and, I would add, acceptable to courts,
that theory must not just include an account of its moral legitimacy, but must also include principled
limits. NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 73.
70 NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 83–84 (observing that while incursions into privacy may have a
subtle impact on the ability to follow through on decisions, the line between acceptable and
unacceptable burdens on decisionmaking is difficult to discern (but nonetheless worthy of
examination)); see also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1130–32 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
effect of financial disclosure laws on autonomy is indirect).
71 Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 750 (“But to call an individual ‘autonomous’ is simply another way
of saying that he is morally free, and to say that the right to privacy protects freedom adds little to our
understanding of the doctrine.”).
72
Id. at 754–55.
73 Id. at 783–84.
74 Id. at 782.
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informational privacy, underwriting the slowness with which a distinct,
precise, and coherent doctrine of informational privacy has developed.75
C. Toward Categoricalism: The Intimate and the Political
This Article argues that the interests served by a right to informational
privacy are more concrete, and in some ways more limited, than the
dominant focus on dignity and autonomy. Informational privacy’s more
nuanced constitutional value is in protecting two categories of
information—intimate or political information—and preventing that
information from serving as the basis for discrimination or political
marginalization. While Part IV provides doctrinal support for a framework
focused on intimate information and political thought, here I briefly
contrast dignity and autonomy, on the one hand, from intimate and political
information, on the other. And, I explain how a categorical approach to
informational privacy captures informational privacy’s normative value
while simultaneously helping to avoid the judicial pitfalls of a dignity and
autonomy approach.
In short, a dignity theory of informational privacy is focused on
purportedly inherent harms that occur when privacy is invaded (for
example, by arguing that it is the intrusion or surveillance itself that causes
harm to individual personhood). While courts are able to, in essence, take
for granted that dignity is harmed in the Fourth Amendment search context
because the intrusion is more shocking and palpable,76 courts grapple to
understand how seemingly mundane bureaucratic or administrative
employment questionnaires, financial disclosure laws, or birth certificate
amendment requirements all infringe on one’s dignity.77 Similarly with
autonomy, while courts understand how laws restricting access to abortion
burden a woman’s right to decide to have an abortion, courts must make
more connective steps to conclude that, for example, a government
database regarding who uses prescription drugs for which there are both a
legitimate and illicit purpose unduly burdens an individual’s ability to
decide whether to take the medicine in the first instance.78
Conversely, intimate information and political thought are of
constitutional value because absent privacy over those categories of
information, individuals are more likely to be exposed to discrimination or
75 See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 650–51 (fearing that “the federal courts are unlikely to
expand protection for any aspect of constitutional privacy because of the enormous controversy over
privacy as autonomy” and explaining that “any aspect of privacy now suffers guilt by association”).
76 See supra note 41.
77 Cf. infra notes 149–67 and accompanying text.
78 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
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marginalization based on their identities, practices, and beliefs.79 That is,
normatively, public disclosure of intimate information and political thought
more directly leads to palpable downstream consequences or harms.80
Informational privacy’s value in preventing such harms is particularly
significant for communities in transition81—that is, communities who have
not yet attained full liberty and equality under the law, such as LGBTQ
communities and individuals with disabilities, such as HIV.82 Importantly,
because courts can more readily perceive (or foresee) those tangible
consequences than any harm to dignity or autonomy, and therefore more
readily perceive the value of privacy over intimate information and
political thought, they may be more prone to definitively recognize a right
to informational privacy if framed in terms of those two values as opposed
to the values of dignity and autonomy, which are only indirectly implicated
by informational privacy violations.83
II. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
Partly influenced by discourse broadly conceptualizing informational
privacy as advancing individuals’ interest in autonomy and dignity, the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been cautious to recognize
the existence of the right out of fear that it will be all-encompassing,

79

For a fuller accounting of this point, see infra Part IV.
Infra note 171.
81 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1286 (1991) (observing that requests for sex equality were translated legally as a demand for privacy);
Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor Brownstein’s
Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 965–66 (1994) (abortion privacy rights serve as a necessary
though inadequate transitional right that must exist until the participatory rights of women are no longer
unequally burdened); see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1764 (2010) (“As long as intolerance and discrimination against LGBT
individuals remain, the need for seclusion, secrecy, and selective self-disclosure will remain as well.”);
Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 368 n.14 (2001)
(collecting authority viewing privacy as a liminal right or doorway enabling people to come out of the
closet).
82 Cf. Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, Discrimination Against State and Local Government LGBT
Employees, 4 LGBTQ POL’Y J. 37, 51 (2014) (documenting that many LGBT employees remain
closeted in the workplace out of fear of discrimination and that employees who are open face higher
percentages of discrimination); JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011) (documenting pervasive discrimination
against transgender individuals).
83 See Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1021–26 (2013)
(explaining that audiences are influenced by how privacy issues are framed). This is not to imply that
there are no other impediments to the recognition of a robust constitutional informational privacy right
that have little to do with how informational privacy’s value is articulated, but rather that a focus on
intimate and political information will move the judiciary to be more receptive toward informational
privacy claims.
80
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paralyze government action, and inundate courts with claims.84 Unable to
understand the particular concrete interests served by an informational
privacy right, courts have failed to consistently and clearly outline the
purported right’s structure and limitations.85 This Part analyzes existing
Supreme Court and circuit precedent, including the recent 2011 Supreme
Court opinion in NASA v. Nelson, and demonstrates that the confusion and
disinclination towards informational privacy is in part a product of the
autonomy–dignity focus that has predominated to date. However, both
explicit and implicit in these decisions is a judicial undercurrent
recognizing, as this Article argues, that informational privacy claims
threatening intimate information or political thought should be given a
privileged position and protected because such protection will prevent
negative downstream consequences, such as discrimination and political
marginalization.
A. Supreme Reluctance
The Supreme Court has been squarely confronted with whether there
exists a constitutional right to informational privacy on three occasions.86
Each time, the Court has avoided recognizing the right. Instead, the Court
84

See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(seeking to avoid “dramatically increas[ing] the number of lawsuits claiming violations of the right to
informational privacy”); see also Denoncourt v. Commonwealth of Pa., State Ethics Comm’n, 470 A.2d
945, 950 (Pa. 1983) (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (expressing concern over “the shadowy
reaches of the right of privacy the judiciary has interpolated into our state and federal constitutions”).
85 Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 955–56 (7th Cir. 2000) (“the scope and contours of [the right to
informational privacy] have not been defined in this Circuit”); Statharos v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine
Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1999) (“the right to privacy is one of the less easily delineated
constitutional guarantees”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786,
793 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (declining to reach a conclusion regarding the “precise contours of the supposed
right”); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) (“the exact boundaries of this right are, to
say the least, unclear”); Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
contours of the confidentiality branch are murky.”); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434,
438 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The exact nature and scope of informational privacy rights have never been fully
developed.”); see also Scott Skinner-Thompson & Rashida Richardson, Prisons and Jails, in AIDS AND
THE LAW 14-1, 14-52 (David W. Webber ed., 4th ed. Supp. 2015) (“the constitutional basis and
parameters of the right to privacy have never been clearly defined”); Ingrid Schüpbach Martin, The
Right to Stay in the Closet: Information Disclosures by Government Officials, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
407, 449 (2002) (the Supreme Court’s informational privacy opinions “leave the right ill-defined and
send conflicting messages about how the lower courts should treat this branch of the right to privacy”);
Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 1309, 1378–79 (2011) (noting that the right to informational privacy “has received limited
attention in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence” and that “the Court is divided over whether to
recognize informational privacy as a right”); Timothy Azarchs, Comment, Informational Privacy:
Lessons from Across the Atlantic, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 805, 806 (2014) (“A series of Supreme Court
cases reached inconclusive decisions that have done little to clarify the situation, leaving the lower
courts to move in different directions.”).
86 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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has assumed for the sake of argument that such a right exists but found no
violation under the facts of the case presented. The Supreme Court’s
reluctance appears to have been influenced by the way that privacy
scholarship and jurisprudence developed, with the Fourth Amendment and
decisional privacy (and their attendant focus on dignity and autonomy)
receiving detailed attention prior to and instead of the right to informational
privacy. I discuss each of the three Supreme Court cases in detail.
1. Whalen v. Roe.—The Court first considered the existence of a
right to informational privacy in the 1977 case of Whalen v. Roe.87 Decided
in 1977, Whalen was issued just four years after that other, more famous
“Roe” case—Roe v. Wade.88 In Roe v. Wade, the Court advanced the right
to decisional privacy first recognized in 1965 in Griswold to include a
woman’s right to have an abortion.89
Whalen involved a challenge to a New York State statute that recorded
the names and addresses of any patient who had obtained, pursuant to a
prescription, drugs for which there was both a lawful and illicit purpose,
such as opium, amphetamines, and methadone.90 New York’s Department
of Health would maintain the prescription record for five years, after which
time the record was destroyed.91 The records were physically secured and
the number of government officials with access to the records was
limited.92 Public disclosure of a patient’s identity was punishable by a year
imprisonment and a $2000 fine.93 The purpose of the law was to help
ensure that drugs with a legitimate purpose were not being abused.94
Though the most significant harm of the statute came from potential
dissemination of the personal prescription information (as opposed to its
mere collection) and the downstream consequences of such dissemination,
the plaintiffs crafted their argument against the law as first and foremost
infringing on their autonomy and dignity. For example, in a direct appeal to
the autonomy concern underlying Roe v. Wade, the plaintiffs argued that
the statute amounted to “state interference with the doctor-patient

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
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429 U.S. 589.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 159–67.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594–95.
Id.
Id. at 597–98.
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relationship.”95 They suggested that the statute would chill “the decisions
[patients] make.”96 The plaintiffs argued that the New York statute
infringed on their “individual autonomy.”97
Elsewhere, the plaintiffs in Whalen framed their argument with
appeals to the patients’ dignity. They repeatedly characterized the
government’s action as an intrusion.98 They invoked the seminal Fourth
Amendment case of Katz v. United States99 and referred to the statute as a
prosecutorial “dragnet.”100 The plaintiffs were attempting to analogize the
New York statute to a physical police search and argue that it intruded onto
their dignity. As in Griswold, it is questionable whether the New York
recording statute amounted to the kind of intrusion triggering the Fourth
Amendment.101 That is, the case did not involve the kind of invasive,
dignity-depriving search courts are accustomed to forbidding absent
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court noted
this dissonance.
Discussing the risk of dissemination, the Court held that mere
disclosure to the Department of Health was not “meaningfully
distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are
associated with many facets of health care.”102 According to the Court, the
provision of some healthcare information to public health agencies is
relatively routine and “does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.”103 The Court directly refuted plaintiffs’ efforts to
compare the New York statute to a Fourth Amendment police search.104
95 Appellees’ Brief at 15, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL 181402, at
*15 [hereinafter Whalen Appellees’ Brief].
96 Id. at *23; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae for
the Nat’l Ass’n of Mental Health et al., at 9–10, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839),
1976 WL 194624, at *9–10 (characterizing Whalen as focused on the patients’ right to make an
autonomous decision about their healthcare).
97 Whalen Appellees’ Brief, supra note 95, at *43.
98 Id. at *22, *24–25, *32–33, *43 (characterizing the central issue as whether a “state may
systematically intrude into the physician-patient relationship,” arguing that patients expect “freedom
from the intrusion of the state,” and that the “systematic intrusion into the physician-patient relationship
unquestionably implicates their constitutionally protected right of privacy,” requiring the court “to
determine if the intrusion is justified,” and raising the specter of “frightening intrusion by even more
subtle state surveillance”). In fact, the plaintiffs in Whalen mention their concern over government
intrusion at least ten times.
99 Id. at *26; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (government wiretapping of
phone calls constitutes an intrusion implicating the Fourth Amendment).
100 Whalen Appellees’ Brief, supra note 95, at *17.
101 See supra note 49.
102 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 604 n.32 (“The Roe appellees also claim that a constitutional privacy right emanates from
the Fourth Amendment, citing language in Terry v. Ohio, at a point where it quotes from Katz v. United
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Nor did the Court believe there was a significant impingement on
patients’ autonomy. The Court held that the statute did not infringe on
patients’ decisions to take prescription drugs, noting that access was not
conditioned on preapproval of any state official and that the decision to
prescribe or use the drug was left to the physician and patient.105 The Court
acknowledged that some patients may be concerned about their reputations
should it become public that they were prescribed drugs that have both a
permissible and illicit purpose, but that such a threatened impact was
insufficient to implicate any autonomy interest.106
Finding no violation of a right to informational privacy, the Court left
unclear whether there exists such a right and its contours. The Court
recognized that unsecured collection and unwarranted disclosure of
“potentially embarrassing or harmful” information may implicate a
constitutional right to informational privacy.107 But, the Court believed the
New York statute at issue did not implicate those security concerns, and so
did not more fully inquire into the constitutional groundings of a right to
informational privacy.108
The test applied to determine whether the New York statute violated
any assumed right to informational privacy was unclear. At times, the
Court characterized the law as a “rational legislative decision” that was not
“unreasonable,” perhaps suggesting that a rational basis test was applied.109
The Court also characterized the state’s interest in controlling dangerous
drugs as “vital,” arguably indicating that a more rigorous standard of
scrutiny was employed.110
2. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.—The Supreme Court
had an opportunity to clarify its approach to informational privacy in a case
argued just two months after Whalen was decided. In Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, former President Richard Nixon
States. But those cases involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual
privacy during the course of criminal investigations. We have never carried the Fourth Amendment’s
interest in privacy as far as the Roe appellees would have us. We decline to do so now.” (internal
citations omitted)).
105 Id. at 603.
106 Id. at 603–04; cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712–13 (1976) (rejecting claim that police
violated right to privacy when they publicly disclosed that a person had been arrested for shoplifting,
seeing no connection between the disclosure and the Fourth Amendment or plaintiff’s decisional
privacy interests).
107 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
108
Id. at 605–06.
109 Id. at 597.
110 Id. at 598.
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challenged a federal statute directing the Administrator of General Services
to take possession of Nixon’s presidential papers and tape recordings and
promulgate regulations for the screening of materials into those which
should be returned to Nixon as personal and those which should be retained
for potential future public access.111 The materials consisted of over 42
million pages of documents and 880 recordings.112
Relying heavily on the Fourth Amendment, Nixon argued that the
statute was “tantamount to a general warrant” permitting a search of all his
papers.113 In a portion of Nixon’s brief quoted by the Court, Nixon claimed,
“the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself.”114
The Court dismissed this comparison, distinguishing an “intrusion into an
individual’s home to search and seize personal papers in furtherance of a
criminal investigation” from the purported impact of an archivist reviewing
Nixon’s papers for “the sole purpose of separating private materials to be
returned” to Nixon from nonprivate papers to be retained as a record of his
Presidency.115
So, once again, the litigant bringing an ostensible informational
privacy claim appealed to his dignity interest in avoiding an intrusive
search. And again, the Court found that no dignity interest was implicated
by the informational privacy claim.116
The Court also failed to take advantage of Nixon to clarify the test for
evaluating informational privacy claims. The Court, perhaps as a result of
the way Nixon framed the claim as sounding in the Fourth Amendment,
suggested that to the extent there was an intrusion, it “must be weighed
against the public interest” in preserving a President’s official
documents.117 Continuing, the Court characterized the law as not “an
unreasonable solution.”118 The Court’s analysis, therefore, was similar to
the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis employed when
nonprosecutorial government action not amounting to a “search” is at issue,

111

433 U.S. 425, 429 (1977).
Id. at 430.
113 Id. at 455–60.
114 Id. at 460 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 148, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977) (No. 75-1605), 1977 WL 189790, at *148).
115 Id. at 462.
116 See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 n.4 (6th Cir. 1981) (the Supreme Court’s “analysis of
the privacy issue in Nixon appears to be based on the fourth amendment’s requirement that all searches
and seizures be reasonable”).
117 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
118 Id. at 464–65.
112
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or when determining whether a search ought to be exempted from warrant
requirement.119
3. NASA v. Nelson.—More than three decades passed before the
Supreme Court again addressed the constitutional right to informational
privacy.120 Those years of silence did not prompt the Court to say much
more. In NASA v. Nelson, government contractors at the JET Propulsion
Laboratory challenged government background check questionnaires that
went to both the contractors and their references.121 The questionnaire to the
contractor probed whether the contractor had ever used, supplied, or
manufactured illegal drugs and, if so, whether the contractor had sought
any treatment for such drug use.122 The questionnaire noted that the
information could not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding.123 The
form sent to references similarly scrutinized whether the contractor had
ever abused alcohol or drugs or whether there were reasons to question the
contractor’s mental stability.124 All responses to the questionnaires were
protected by the Privacy Act, which restricts public access to the completed
questionnaires subject to certain (debatably broad) exceptions.125
While the Nelson plaintiffs emphasized to the Supreme Court that the
questionnaires constituted an intrusion into their privacy even if the
information was not disseminated publicly,126 their arguments relied much
less heavily on dignity and autonomy and much less on Fourth Amendment
precedent and decisional privacy than did the plaintiffs’ arguments in

119

Infra note 208.
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s hesitance to recognize a right to informational privacy in the
1970s was a Bickelian move during a transitional social period—the Court was seeking to start, rather
than truncate, a national discussion regarding privacy. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station:
Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 144 (2014) (arguing that the
Court used federalism as a form of “Bickelian passive virtue and an enabling device” in United States v.
Windsor to incrementally promote same-sex relationship equality). This interpretation seems even more
plausible considering that both Whalen and Nixon were decided shortly after Roe v. Wade, where the
Court, by some accounts, proceeded without Bickelian caution, thus prompting social backlash. Cf. id.
at 138. However, irrespective of the Court’s motivations when first confronted with informational
privacy in the 1970s, as the Court’s 2011 decision in Nelson and the intervening circuit court confusion
demonstrate (discussed infra), the Court seems to have let the conversation languish without direction
for too long.
121 131 S. Ct. 746, 754–55 (2011).
122 Id. at 753.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Brief for Respondents at 36, NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (No. 09-530), 2010 WL
3048324, at *36.
120
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Whalen and Nixon.127 Instead, the Nelson plaintiffs highlighted first and
foremost that the questionnaires targeted highly “sensitive personal” and
“intimate health” information, and that this category of information was
entitled to constitutional protection.128 Plaintiffs also noted that, as part of
NASA’s “suitability matrix” used to evaluate employees, NASA
considered such factors as sodomy, homosexuality, adultery, and mental or
psychological issues.129
The Court seemed not to take issue with the assertion that the
questionnaires implicated privacy interests of constitutional significance.
This is in contrast to the Whalen and Nixon decisions, where the Court
downplayed the privacy interests at stake because it could not see the
intrusion; that is, it could not see the purported connection to dignity and
autonomy.130 In Nelson, to overcome the privacy interest in intimate,
personal information, the Court spent the lion’s share of its opinion
trumpeting the countervailing governmental interests in this information,
including the importance of the positions to the nation’s space program.131
The Court also distinguished the Government’s role as employer (where
background checks are not uncommon) from its policing function,
concluding that the Government has more latitude when acting in its
capacity as employer.132 Finally, as in Whalen and Nixon, the Court
emphasized that there were statutory protections limiting the risk of public
dissemination of this information133 and any consequent downstream harm.
While the Court in Nelson seemed compelled by the plaintiffs’
concern over intimate, personal information, in its efforts to override that
interest, the Court once again left unclear the appropriate test or framework
for evaluating informational privacy claims. The Court emphasized the
reasonableness of the government questionnaire no less than ten times in its
opinion.134 The Court also rejected a requirement that the Government
demonstrate that its questionnaires are “‘necessary’ or the least restrictive

127 That said, the Nelson plaintiffs did not totally abandon appeals to dignity. See id. at *40. Nor
did Nixon totally neglect to highlight the intimate nature of some of the information at stake. See, e.g.,
Brief for Appellant at 22, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (No. 75-1605), 1977 WL
189790, at *22.
128 Id. at *17, *20.
129 Id. at *29–30.
130 See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
131 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2011) (noting that “the work that contract employees
perform is critical to NASA’s mission,” that it is “important work,” and that the government has an
interest in conducting background checks for employees engaged in such work).
132 Id. at 760–61.
133 Id. at 762.
134 See, e.g., id. at 761.
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means of furthering its interests,” at least in the context of when it is
issuing an employment background check.135
But as Justice Scalia’s concurrence noted, the majority opinion did
little to clarify the “doctrinal obscurity” surrounding the right to
informational privacy, and used the “vague” opinions in Whalen and Nixon
to justify issuing another vague opinion regarding the assumed
informational privacy right.136 Justice Scalia continued, lambasting the
majority for listing a “multiplicity of unweighted, relevant factors,” all of
which could be used to evaluate the hypothetical right to informational
privacy.137
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has confronted, and
avoided, the constitutional right to informational privacy on three
occasions. Each time, the Court has assumed that such a right exists but
found no violation under the facts. The Court’s reluctance appears in part to
be a result of unclear conceptions of the interests directly served by
constitutional informational privacy. The Court’s hesitant and inconsistent
analysis has sewn confusion among the circuit courts.
B. Circuit Confusion
Faced with this “doctrinal obscurity,” the circuit courts continue to
wrestle with constitutional informational privacy. As the Supreme Court
observed in Nelson but did little to correct, “[s]tate and lower federal courts
have offered a number of different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon
over the years.”138 While the majority of circuits have concluded that a
constitutional right to informational privacy does exist, the circuits are
divided.139 Those circuits that do recognize the right have rarely enforced
it.140
The circuits have also been unclear on the appropriate level of scrutiny
for evaluating informational privacy claims.141 Several employ a rational
135

Id. at 750.
Id. at 767 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
137 Id. at 768.
138 Id. at 756 n.9 (majority opinion).
139 For a discussion of cases expressing skepticism regarding the right, see notes 149–67 and
accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1138, 1143 (3d Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging existence of right to informational privacy over HIV status, but failing to enforce the
right); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1999) (similar).
141 See Fan, supra note 6, at 957–58 (“The courts—including the Supreme Court—have wavered
and seesawed between flexible reasonableness interest-balancing all the way up to what looks like strict
scrutiny.”).
136
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basis “balancing test” tilted in favor of the government,142 some utilize what
sounds like intermediate scrutiny,143 and others require strict scrutiny in
certain circumstances.144 Others still reflect internal, intra-circuit confusion
and seem to employ some permutation of the traditional three levels of
scrutiny.145 Some apply a different test depending on the content of the
information at stake.146 Finally, some at times appeared to apply the Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy test,147 and others hint that at

142 In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying nonexhaustive, multifactor
balancing test); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1987) (indicating that some balancing of
interests may be appropriate, but that there is little guidance on “how such interests would be
balanced”); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (employing a
balancing test with little analysis); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d
Cir. 1980) (weighing multiple factors); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th Cir. 1979)
(employing a rational basis test and evaluating whether “the legitimate governmental interests”
outweigh the “incidental intrusion” into privacy).
143 Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring that plaintiff’s substantial
interest in medical information be “overcome by a sufficiently strong state interest,” but not stating how
strong); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 793 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (government has presented “sufficiently weighty interests” that “justify the intrusions”); Doe v.
City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (confirming that intermediate scrutiny applies in
Second Circuit); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting rational basis, but
focusing on “legitimate” government interests); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131–34 (5th Cir.
1978) (rejecting rational basis and noting that strict scrutiny has been applied in autonomy privacy
cases, but employing a balancing test with regard to financial information).
144 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686 (6th Cir. 1998) (employing strict scrutiny where government
action implicated fundamental right to privacy of sexual information); Walls v. City of Petersburg,
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring the government “to prove that a compelling governmental
interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy interest”); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839
(10th Cir. 1986) (applying strict scrutiny to informational privacy claim).
145 Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying an inconsistent
standard requiring the government to show that “its use of the information would advance a legitimate
state interest and that its actions are narrowly tailored”); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (observing that the “Supreme Court has applied a
flexible balancing approach,” but that “[m]ost circuits appear to apply an ‘intermediate standard of
review’ for the majority of confidentiality violations, with a compelling interest analysis reserved for
‘severe intrusions’ on confidentiality”) (citation omitted); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir.
1984) (describing the governmental interest as “compelling,” but noting simply that the competing
interests must be “weighed”); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559, 1564 (2d Cir. 1983)
(purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny because “some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is
necessary to safeguard the confidentiality interest,” but elsewhere relying on rational basis precedent
and concluding that the law “must stand unless ‘very wide of any reasonable mark’”); Thorne v. City of
El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring the government to show that its inquiry was
justified by “legitimate interests” (the rational basis standard) and that it was narrowly tailored (the
strict scrutiny standard)).
146 Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 443–46 (6th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply strict scrutiny—
or any other substantive weighing of interests—where only financial information was at stake, as
opposed to a fundamental right); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981) (evaluation of
government interest only required if fundamental right implicated). In this way, the Sixth Circuit’s
approach, which has been criticized by some as the most restrictive, is perhaps most consistent with the
approach advocated here.
147 Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy balancing test to informational privacy claim
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the applicability of the undue burden test governing decisional privacy
cases in the abortion context.148
As with the Supreme Court, the circuits’ confusion regarding the
appropriate standard and reluctance to rigorously enforce a right to
informational privacy appears, at least partially, to be a product of the lack
of a direct connection between traditional appeals to dignity and autonomy
and informational privacy. Some examples are instructive.
By certain accounts, the Sixth Circuit has been the most reticent to
embrace a constitutional right to informational privacy.149 In J.P. v.
DeSanti, the court considered the constitutionality of an Ohio law that
permitted the “social histories” of juvenile offenders to be made available
to over fifty-five government, social, and religious agencies.150 The social
histories included “intimate biographical details.”151 Following the Supreme
Court’s example in Nixon, the Sixth Circuit relied on Katz—one of the
leading Fourth Amendment intrusion cases—to downplay the extent of the
intrusion caused by the law.152 The court retorted (quoting Katz) that
“[v]irtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to
some degree.”153 With that, the court concluded that courts could not
possibly be called upon to review and balance “every government action
against the corresponding intrusion on individual privacy.”154 Not only did
the court fail to see how the limited disclosure of the social histories
constituted an actionable intrusion analogous to those protected by the
Fourth Amendment, but it could not fathom policing every such potential
privacy claim.155 The court seemed to be searching for some limiting
principle. It held “that not all rights of privacy or interests in nondisclosure
of private information are of constitutional dimension, so as to require
balancing government action against individual privacy,”156 seemingly
related to medical tests); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (whether
plaintiff has an informational privacy interest depends on whether “he has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information”).
148 Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 538–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing whether the type of
information requested would have placed an “undue burden” on “any other right other than the putative
right to privacy of the information itself”).
149 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 85, at 425; Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy,
99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 57 n.127 (2014).
150 653 F.2d at 1082.
151 Id. at 1086.
152 Id. at 1089–90.
153 Id. at 1090 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967)).
154
Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1091.
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leaving the door open to a more nuanced, categorical approach to
informational privacy claims.
The D.C. Circuit has characterized itself as sharing the Sixth Circuit’s
trepidation.157 In American Federation of Government Employees v.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, members of the
American Federation of Government Employees and the union itself
challenged two form employment questionnaires issued by federal
agencies.158 The forms were not unlike those subsequently addressed by the
Supreme Court in Nelson, and included questions regarding the employees’
drug use, mental health history, and financial stability.159 Although part of
the court’s decision rested on the government safeguards against public
dissemination of the information collected via questionnaire, the court also
criticized as “Delphic” the Supreme Court’s attempt to support the
existence of an informational privacy right with reliance on Fourth
Amendment case law.160 The D.C. Circuit also specifically took issue with
the district court’s characterization of one questionnaire as “so vast an
intrusion.”161 In the end, the court was unpersuaded by attempts to
analogize the right to informational privacy to the Fourth Amendment and
failed to see the questionnaires as directly implicating the dignity interest
served by the Fourth Amendment.162
Courts have likewise been unpersuaded by attempts to argue that
collection or disclosure of private information violates an informational
privacy right implicating an autonomy interest. For example, in Barry v.
City of New York, employees of the New York City police and fire
departments challenged the constitutionality of certain financial disclosure
157 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“The Sixth Circuit, which until today was alone among the courts of appeals, has been dubious.”).
158 Id. at 788–89.
159 Id. at 788.
160 Id. at 791.
161 Id. at 794; see also Big Ridge, Inc. v., Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d
631 (7th Cir. 2013) (analyzing miners’ informational privacy claims to medical records under the
Fourth Amendment and finding no violation).
162 The outsized role of dignity in discussion of informational privacy claims emerged early on in
circuit jurisprudence, perhaps because informational privacy claims were brought in tandem with cases
that also clearly implicated traditional Fourth Amendment searches. For example, in York v. Story,
324 F.2d 450, 451–52 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a woman’s informational
privacy rights were violated when she came to report a sexual assault to the police, the police
subsequently photographed her nude, and then distributed the photos among the department for no law
enforcement purpose. The case was an easy one for the court because it fit nicely into the dignity–
intrusion paradigm. There was a search (the photographs), which by itself infringed on her dignity, and
the distribution further denigrated her dignity. Id. at 455. But in the vast majority of cases when there is
no illegitimate search or intrusion in the first instance (as “intrusion” is classically conceived under the
Fourth Amendment), courts continue to lack a coherent framework for addressing government
dissemination of intimate information.
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laws.163 They argued that “public disclosure will impair their autonomy
interests by forcing them to redefine their marital and family
relationships.”164 When the court balanced the purported privacy interests
against the governmental interests, it noted that disclosure could be
“personally embarrassing,” but seemed to give little weight to any harm to
autonomy.165 Evidently, the court believed that such a harm was too
specious and concluded that the government’s interests in deterring official
malfeasance outweighed any possible disclosure of personally
embarrassing facts.166 Similarly, in Seaton v. Mayberg, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a medical informational privacy claim in part because the plaintiff
failed to allege that disclosure of the information would have placed an
“undue burden” on or discouraged the plaintiff from obtaining medical
assistance.167
At the same time that they have been largely unpersuaded by generic
appeals to dignity or autonomy, circuits have expressed greater concern
over dissemination than mere government collection.168 This intensified
concern highlights the shortcomings of the traditional intrusion-based
dignity approach to informational privacy claims. The types of government
action at play in informational privacy claims, frequently involving
government questionnaires or information obtained through less obviously
coercive means than a police search, simply do not register with courts as
constituting an intrusion implicating the plaintiff’s personal dignity.169
Judicial emphasis on the dangers of dissemination of private
information not only demonstrates the relatively tangential role of an
intrusion–dignity theory of informational privacy, but also the pertinence of
163

712 F.2d 1554, 1556 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1561.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1563.
167 610 F.3d 530, 538–39 (9th Cir. 2010).
168 See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1186 (10th Cir. 2011) (observing that courts seem more
likely to find informational privacy violations where state actors have publicly disclosed a citizen’s
private information); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 793
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he individual interest in protecting the privacy of the information sought by the
government is significantly less important where the information is collected by the government but not
disseminated publicly.”); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he federal courts also apply stricter scrutiny when there is unguarded public disclosure
of confidential information.”); Barry, 712 F.2d at 1561 (“[t]he adverse effect of public disclosure on
privacy interests is considerably greater than the effect of disclosure to the” government); Statharos v.
N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 326 (2d Cir. 1999) (same).
169 See Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (characterizing as
“limited intrusion[s]” general polygraph control questions to fire department employees that did not
touch on sexual relations).
164
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a categorical approach170 focused on downstream, social consequences.
Courts appear more open to informational privacy claims when the
dissemination of certain categories of information presages direct,
downstream consequences, such as potential discrimination.171
As outlined more completely in Part IV, not all categories of
information are treated equally (nor should they be) and courts have been
particularly sympathetic towards informational privacy claims where
plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate that either intimate information or
political thought is being jeopardized.172
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
We now know where we are (confusion over the existence of the right
to informational privacy and its contours) and how we got here (in part, the
imprecise extant focus on autonomy and dignity as the principal values of
informational privacy).
Why does it matter? Why should we care about establishing a clear
framework for evaluating constitutional informational privacy claims? I
offer three reasons. First, informational privacy threats continue to grow,
particularly as both the administrative state and technology’s power
continue to augment. Second, to the extent one level of scrutiny or
framework has emerged as a frontrunner among the circuits, it is a rational170

See Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) (“must examine the nature of the
material opened to public view to assess whether” it is protected); Thorne v. City of El Segundo,
726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that different levels of scrutiny apply based on the type of
privacy interest at stake).
171 Tuscon Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004) (giving weight to “the
potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure”); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959–
60 (9th Cir. 1999) (no privacy violation for disclosure of a social security number because “its
disclosure does not lead directly to injury, embarrassment or stigma,” unlike the disclosure of one’s
HIV status); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing a constitutional right to
keep changes in gender identity private because to reveal such information would result in
discrimination); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062–63 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying
strict scrutiny where disclosure of information “created a very real threat” to the plaintiff’s security); In
re Doe, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“An individual revealing that she is HIV seropositive
potentially exposes herself not to understanding or compassion but to discrimination and intolerance,
further necessitating the extension of the right to confidentiality over such information.”); Alexander v.
Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (if disclosure implicated a tangible interest such as
employment, it would be constitutionally protected); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir.
1981) (in concluding that plaintiff stated a claim, noting that plaintiff alleged “he has been forced to
move his residence” and “has been unable to obtain meaningful employment”); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (weighing “the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure”); Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329, 332 (5th
Cir. 1973) (considering whether the release of private information “damaged [plaintiffs’] reputations
and interfered with their ability to engage in their occupation”). But see Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d
1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (“When a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, violation of privacy is
harmful without any concrete consequential damages.”).
172 See infra Part IV.
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basis balancing test insufficiently robust to provide meaningful
informational privacy protection. Finally, the prevalence of the third-party
doctrine also continues to bar many informational privacy claims.173 A
framework for informational privacy giving primacy to intimate
information and political thought would remedy many of these pressing
problems.
A. Privacy Threats, New and Old
That advances in collection, aggregation, and dissemination
technologies have been accompanied by threats to privacy is widely
recognized.174 Privacy scholars have seen the burgeoning threat from
technology for some time.175 As has the Supreme Court.176 Just this past
year, the Court explicitly recognized the threat posed by digitized
information and data, taking the rare step of enhancing Fourth Amendment
protections in response to that threat.177
173 See infra Section III.C (explaining that the third-party doctrine, which holds that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy when the information has not been kept completely secret and has
been shared with a so-called third party, is a product of the Fourth Amendment, dignity–intrusion
theory of informational privacy).
174 Sklansky, supra note 50, at 1084 (“Control over the collection, processing, and dissemination of
personal information matters, and it matters more and more as the technologies of data collection, data
processing, and data sharing gain power exponentially and penetrate ever deeper into daily life.”); J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, Preface to NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 33, at vii, vii
(“Among the wasting assets of modern society, privacy ranks high. The products of modern technology
and some of the direct and indirect effects of mass society combine to enhance its scarcity value.”);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of
Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 626 (2011) (technological growth threatens privacy by both
enhancing the government’s means to intrude into traditional private areas, and by creating more
opportunities for intrusion through the creation of “technology-mediated social” interactions)
[hereinafter, Strandburg, Home, Home]; Katherine J. Strandburg, Monitoring, Datafication, and
Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 5, 10–12 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (noting that
datafication increases the ability to which collected information can be catalogued and organized,
therefore increasing the potential it will be used for unintended purposes); NISSENBAUM, supra note 40,
at 21 (documenting the rise of technically mediated monitoring); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent,
93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 129–33 (2014) (documenting the privacy threats posed by the “Internet of
Things”).
175 MILLER, supra note 32, at 205 (foreshadowing in 1971 that “the available [legal] protection is
not adequate to meet the threat to informational privacy that already exists and is certain to become
more acute in the future”).
176 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy
implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files.”).
177 In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court addressed whether pursuant to the search-incident-toarrest exception to the warrant requirement, police could search digital information on the cell phone of
a person being lawfully arrested. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). The Court held that such a search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2494–95. In distinguishing cell phones from other

190

SKINNER-THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2015 11:07 AM

110:159 (2015)

Outing Privacy

As such, this Article will not dwell on what others have artfully
documented regarding the rising tide of technologically-advanced privacy
infringements from both the public and private sector. However, while
much attention has been paid to the fact that the formal state and its
apparatuses no longer possess a monopoly when it comes to large-scale
invasions of privacy,178 it is important to emphasize that the government
continues to deploy its immense resources in sophisticated ways, which
jeopardize individual privacy.179 The NSA’s telephone metadata program is
but one prominent example.180 There are many others, most of which
receive less public attention.181 Moreover, the government regularly
borrows from and relies on private sector databases,182 blurring the lines
between state and private action. Accordingly, a constitutional solution
focused on the government is necessary.
Finally, while the digital Information Age has amplified many privacy
risks from the government, certain threats to informational privacy of a
more traditional vintage remain of vital concern. For example, as noted in
the Introduction, purportedly vanilla policies requiring individuals to
provide proof of surgery before changing gender designations on

tangible items found on a person (such as cigarette packets), the Court documented the vast quantity
and intimate quality of digital information potentially contained on a cell phone. Id. at 2489, 2492.
178 For a compelling, postmodern account of some ways in which state and private power work in
tandem to jeopardize constitutional rights, including the right to privacy, see Kendall Thomas, Beyond
the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1478–81 (1992) (embracing a Foucaultian conception
of power in analyzing the relationship between state regulation of sexual practices and private
enforcement of those regulations).
179 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 73 (2014) (“We likely
know only a fraction of what the government has done in the area of illegal surveillance since 9/11.”).
180 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]he almost-Orwellian technology
that enables the Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user in the
United States is unlike anything that could have been conceived in 1979.”), vacated, 800 F.3d 559
(D.C. Cir. 2015); see also ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648, 692–93 (6th Cir. 2007) (outlining the
NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program by which the government, without a warrant, intercepted
telephone and e-mail communications where at least one party was located outside of the United States,
but concluding that the plaintiffs’ lacked standing to challenge the law).
181 For instance, until recently, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) failed to
encrypt, and therefore risked exposing, the identities of visitors to AIDS.gov, a HHS-operated website
that provides visitors with information on services for the treatment of HIV and AIDS. See Craig
Timberg, Federal Sites Leaked the Locations of People Seeking AIDS Services for Years, WASH. POST:
THE SWITCH (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/07/federalsites-leaked-the-locations-of-people-seeking-aids-services-for-years/ [http://perma.cc/Q33U-S7P2]; see
also NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 54 (noting the vast amounts of intimate information available via
court records).
182 See, e.g., Craig Timberg, U.S. Threatened Massive Fine to Force Yahoo to Release Data,
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/us-threatenedmassive-fine-to-force-yahoo-to-release-data/2014/09/11/38a7f69e-39e8-11e4-9c9febb47272e40e_story.html [http://perma.cc/QEJ8-J4DF].
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government-issued identification documents183 directly infringe on
transgender individuals’ informational privacy.184 For the many transgender
people who are unable or choose not to have gender confirmation
surgery,185 the government’s surgery requirement publicly outs the
individual to anyone (such as an employer) who observes the dissonance
between the person’s identification and gender presentation, subjecting
them to potential discrimination.186 To the extent transgender individuals do
comply with the surgery requirement, they are forced to provide intimate
medical and sexual details to the state, in many cases leaving a public
record.187
In addition to laws pertaining to government IDs, transgender people
are also outed when governments, schools, or employers refuse to let them
use a bathroom consistent with their gender expression, and force them to
use bathrooms that align with the sex assigned at birth or segregate them in
unisex restrooms.188 In a handful of states, so-called papers-to-pee laws
have been proposed which, if enacted, penalize transgender people for
using restrooms inconsistent with the sex they were assigned at birth.189
183 See, e.g., Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure
Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the
Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 400–01 (2013) (documenting jurisdictions
with a surgery requirement for birth certificates). A revised Model State Vital Statistics Act that would
remove the surgery requirement for obtaining an accurate birth certificate is under review by HHS, but
as of October 2015 has not yet been approved. See MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT & MODEL
STATE VITAL STATISTICS REGULATIONS § 24(a)(4) (CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
2011
Revision),
http://www.naphsis.org/Documents/FinalMODELLAWSeptember72011.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q5F7-MR3A]. It would then need to be adopted by the various states. Id. at 4.
184 See K.L. v. State of Alaska, No. 3AN-11-05431 CI, 2012 WL 2685183, at *8 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Mar. 12, 2012). The author provided early research assistance to the ACLU, plaintiff’s counsel in K.L.
v. State of Alaska, on fertile jurisdictions for an informational privacy lawsuit challenging strict gender
marker modification requirements.
185 Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student
Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 291 (2013) (noting that “medical transition—particularly
genital surgery—is not affordable, necessary, or appropriate for all transgender people”).
186 Mottet, supra note 183, at 391–92 (2013) (“This is not an abstract issue; inspection of one’s
birth certificate (or documents it generates) can lead directly to discrimination and even violence,
especially when a situation involves interactions with security officers, employment, or access to sexsegregated facilities.”); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 754–57 (2008)
(describing the employment consequences caused by lack of an accurate identification document).
187 Mottet, supra note 183, at 432 (arguing that policies which provide access to records indicating
that a person changed their gender marker create privacy concerns).
188 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54 (E.D. Va. June 11,
2015) (alleging that the school district forbids trans boy from using boys’ restroom, isolating and
stigmatizing him).
189 See Jana Kasperkevic, ‘Papers to Pee’: Texas, Kentucky and Florida Consider AntiTransgender Bills, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/
2015/mar/24/papers-to-pee-texas-kentucky-and-florida-consider-anti-transgender-bills [http://perma.cc/
3EYC-U27U].
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Some of these proposed laws would charge owners of public
accommodations with enforcement of the laws and punish those owners
with liability in civil suits if they permit patrons to use the “wrong”
restroom.190 The impact such laws would have on individuals’ privacy is
apparent.191
Providing privacy to LGBTQ individuals is particularly important
given that federal law and most states do not provide comprehensive or
explicit employment discrimination protections based on gender identity
and sexual orientation.192 In other words, privacy serves as a liminal right
while queer individuals continue to fight for full inclusion.193
Similarly, while there are employment discrimination protections for
people living with HIV through the Americans with Disability Act,194
190 See, e.g., H.B. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (“An owner of public accommodations, a
school, or a place of employment who maintains single-sex public facilities and knowingly advertises,
promotes, or encourages use of those facilities in violation of subsection (2), or fails to take reasonable
remedial measures after learning of such use, is liable in a civil action to any person who is lawfully
using those facilities at the time of the unlawful entry for the damages caused by the unlawful entry,
together with reasonable attorney fees and costs.”).
191 Transgender individuals are also uniquely vulnerable to being outed during airport screening
procedures. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY: FEDERAL
AGENDA FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 35 (2015), http://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/
resources/NCTE_Blueprint_2015_Travel.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RZ4-S8SD].
192 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, has been introduced on several occasions but has
failed to pass Congress. See Lydia DePillis, This Is the Next Front in the Battle for Gay Rights, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (June 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/
06/26/this-is-the-next-frontier-in-the-battle-for-gay-rights/ [http://perma.cc/GD4N-JY92] (“The federal
Employment Non-Discrimination Act has been introduced in most sessions of Congress since 1994, but
failed each time, most recently in 2013.”). In the summer of 2015, a much broader bill, called the
Equality Act, was introduced and would provide protections for LGBT individuals not just in
employment, but in housing, credit, and public accommodations. See Paul Kane, The Next Battle in the
Gay Rights Movement Kicks off on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-next-battle-in-gay-rights-movement-kicks-off-on-capitolhill/2015/07/23/0d565804-314b-11e5-8f36-18d1d501920d_story.html [http://perma.cc/R427-PBAA].
That said, there is compelling authority indicating that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. See Complainant v.
Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *9–10 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015); Macy v. Holder, No.
0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7–9 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012); see also Skinner-Thompson &
Turner, supra note 185, at 283–85 (collecting authority extending Title VII protections to transgender
individuals). However, there is not yet national judicial consensus on the extent of Title VII’s reach.
Moreover, as the recent social debate regarding Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act
highlights, sexual orientation remains an unprotected basis for discrimination by public
accommodations in many states. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Religious Protection Laws, Once Called
Shields, Are Now Seen as Cudgels, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/31/us/politics/religious-protection-laws-once-called-shields-are-now-seen-as-cudgels.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/CF9M-QRU6].
193 See supra note 81.
194 See generally Scott Skinner-Thompson, HIV and Employment, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra
note 85; Scott Thompson, Abbott, AIDS, and the ADA: Why a Per Se Disability Rule for HIV/AIDS is
Both Just and a Must, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2008).
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providing robust privacy protections for people living with HIV is an
important antecedent protection that will help ensure that the discrimination
does not happen in the first instance. Because misunderstandings of and
stigma towards people living with HIV remains prevalent in the United
States,195 people living with HIV must retain the ability to keep their
medical status confidential.196 Despite the limited privacy protections
afforded by statutory regimes such as the Health Information Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which provides no private cause of
action and generally only applies to healthcare entities and providers,197
state officials, such as corrections officers or police officers, have
repeatedly disclosed individuals’ HIV statuses, exposing the individuals to
discrimination and possible violence.198
Moreover, we live in an increasingly polarized, politically charged
time,199 requiring that individuals’ political beliefs remain within their
power to disclose if and when they see fit. Otherwise, individuals risk
being exposed to subtle forms of discrimination if their unpopular beliefs
are collected and forcibly disclosed by the government. While government
employees are protected from employment discrimination based on their

195 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HIV/AIDS AT 30: A PUBLIC OPINION PERSPECTIVE 3–
11
(2011),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8186-hiv-surveyreport_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/KPG5-HVYQ] (documenting sustained but declining stigma towards
those living with HIV).
196 To be clear, privacy alone will not solve persistent stigma and discrimination regarding HIV.
Education regarding the disease is the most potent antidote towards continued misunderstanding. But
privacy is a necessary tool to protect people living with HIV while discrimination persists, and, from a
public health perspective, is key to encouraging people to be tested and discover their HIV status, lest
they fear that if they are HIV-positive, it will become public, causing them to be ostracized. Similarly,
while some have suggested that in some ways “privacy” perpetuates the oppression of LGBTQ
individuals and forces them into the closet, see Thomas, supra note 178, at 1455–56, privacy remains
an important safeguard as individuals decide—on their own terms and not on the government’s—when
and with whom to discuss their sexuality or gender identity.
197 45 C.F.R. § 160.102–03 (2014) (defining covered entities under HIPAA as health care plans,
providers, or clearinghouses). While HIPAA does not directly provide a private cause of action, the
Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that it could be used to establish the standard of care for a
negligence suit. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 49 (Conn. 2014).
Additionally, law enforcement officers that necessarily must observe a prisoner’s medical details have
been held to be covered by HIPAA. See, e.g., Warren v. Corcoran, No. 9:09-CV-1146 (DNH/ATB),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135012, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011).
198 See, e.g., Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000) (public disclosure of HIV
status by probation officer); see also infra note 251 (collecting several cases where state officials
disclosed an individual’s HIV status).
199 Nate Cohn, Polarization Is Dividing American Society, Not Just Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/polarization-is-dividing-american-society-not-justpolitics.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 [http://perma.cc/J6VL-EE2P] (summarizing a Pew survey
documenting the trenchant ideological divisions in America).
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political beliefs,200 private sector employees lack comprehensive
protections.201 Accordingly, ensuring that political thought is not collected
and disclosed is a key preliminary bulwark against potential discrimination.
Put briefly, the state’s formal power to collect and disseminate private
information remains very real, if at times subtle, and the potential for
constitutional privacy protection warrants our attention and that of the
courts.202
B. Balancing Failures
Notwithstanding these threats to informational privacy, many circuits
employ a balancing test that flexibly weighs the government’s interest in
either obtaining or disseminating the information with the plaintiff’s
interest in maintaining confidentiality.203 This balancing test, which
resembles the test employed for evaluating much government conduct
under the Fourth Amendment, takes a handful of forms, and has been
advocated by several scholars. It provides no real protection.
A brief review of cases employing a balancing test illustrates the test’s
limitations. The Third Circuit has provided the most guidance regarding the
factors to be considered in weighing the competing interests of the state
and an individual’s privacy. In United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., the court established that multiple factors must be weighed,
including the type of record requested, any potential for harm from any
subsequent nonconsensual dissemination, the adequacy of any safeguards
limiting further dissemination, the degree of need for access, and the
existence of any express statutory mandate for access.204 Other circuits are

200

See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that the Elrod-Branti rule
prohibiting hiring discrimination by government officials on the basis of party affiliation extends to
low-level government positions).
201 Cf. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996) (extending constitutional
protections to government contractors, but presumably leaving other private sector employees
unprotected).
202 See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 656 (informational privacy law is in “dramatic need of
development”); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (constitutional protection cannot
wait for legislative action because “the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to
government agency protocols”); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System:
Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions,
111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 537 (2013) (arguing that both the Court and Congress should take active
responsibility for regulating privacy in the twenty-first century). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV.
801, 805 (2004) (arguing that courts should proceed with caution in regulating criminal justice
technologies under the Fourth Amendment).
203 Supra note 142.
204 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir.
2010) (also applying a multifactor balancing test).
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less precise. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has simply employed a
balancing test “comparing the interests [the action] serves with those it
hinders.”205 In practice, the balancing test—whether multifactored or openended—rarely results in the vindication of privacy rights206 and amounts to
little more than rational basis review.207
There are two principal reasons for the balancing test’s failure. First,
because of the influence of the intrusion–dignity theory of privacy on
informational privacy jurisprudence, the balancing test is a product of
Fourth Amendment case law.208 Because that balancing test was originally
designed to redress intrusions upon one’s dignity (even if the intrusion was
not serious enough to require a warrant),209 it is ill suited to addressing the
separate interests served by an informational privacy right. In other words,
because harms to human dignity and autonomy are incidental in the
informational privacy context, often not involving forcible searches or a
direct impact on one’s decisional freedoms, informational privacy claims
rarely prevail under the nonrigorous balancing test. The test’s vague
contours contain no specific mechanism to give weight to claims not
involving what courts traditionally encounter as “intrusions” within the

205 Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) (alteration in original)).
206 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580 (no violation under balancing test, notwithstanding that
sensitive medical information was at stake).
207 JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 124–25 (2008) (noting that some courts have utilized
a balancing test amounting to rational basis review for informational privacy claims). But see Plante,
575 F.2d at 1131–34 (employing a balancing test, but suggesting it is somehow more rigorous than
rational basis review).
208 Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s terms, the government may not conduct a search without
probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause requires the presence of facts that would
“warrant a person of reasonable caution” to believe the existence of evidence of a particular crime is
present. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983) (plurality opinion)). But, in practice, the relatively robust “probable cause” test is rarely
employed because the definition of what constitutes a “search” triggering the probable cause standard
has been narrowed considerably. For example, where a person lacks a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the information, no search occurs. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). Similarly,
the Supreme Court has distinguished between criminal investigatory searches, which are subject to
probable cause, and administrative searches, which are not. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling
Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 256–57 (2011). Absent a narrowly-defined criminal
“search,” the government’s actions are generally governed by a balancing of interests test that
resembles rational basis review. Id.; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e
generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
209 See supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment context.210 That is, the test does not speak directly to,
and undervalues, the interests served by an informational privacy right.
Second, and relatedly, the test is fundamentally subjective.211 Courts
are accustomed to hearing Fourth Amendment cases that involve actual,
physical intrusions implicating the dignity interest, as well as decisional
privacy claims directly infringing on a person’s autonomy. No such
interests are directly implicated in most informational privacy claims.
Given the subjectivity of the test, and courts’ relative lack of experience
outside the intrusion and decisional contexts, courts’ natural tendency to
defer to the state is amplified even more than in the Fourth Amendment or
decisional privacy contexts.212 This tendency is likely to become even more
pronounced as the government continues to recast private conduct as
implicating matters of public concern, at least where that private conduct
involves public employees and could reflect poorly on the public institution
or be construed as conduct unbecoming a public employee.213
Notwithstanding that the balancing test has proved to be a relatively
meaningless restraint on government incursions into individual
informational privacy, the test has been advocated by several scholars.214
210 Cohen, supra note 18, at 1904 (“Pleas to ‘balance’ the harms of privacy invasion against the
asserted gains lack visceral force.”); Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 761 (1989) (“There is nothing like a
good balancing test for avoiding rigorous argument.”); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE:
THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 2 (2011) (“Privacy often loses out to security
when it shouldn’t. Security interests are readily understood, for life and limb are at stake, while privacy
rights remain more abstract and vague.”).
211 Chlapowski, supra note 63, at 157 (“Vague balancing tests lend themselves too easily to the
subjective choices of the presiding judge.”); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1410, 1431 (1974) (“[T]he jurisprudence of judicial balancing remains essentially ad hoc and
subjective.”).
212 David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection,
41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 833 (1991) (balancing tests may be tilted in favor of governmental
interest and values); SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 88 (agreeing that balancing “is often done in a
perfunctory manner or in ways that skew the result in one way or another” and suggesting that the
challenge is to ensure “that the balancing process be as rigorous and thoughtful as possible”); cf.
NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 8 (“Business and government interests in accumulating and using
personal information have often prevailed in the face of public complaints, with a few well-known
exceptions.”).
213 See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 772 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding as
constitutional a reprimand of a police officer for engaging in an extramarital affair while attending a
work conference, after the conference session had ended for the day).
214 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 145–47 (1991) (arguing that a balancing
test would provide plaintiffs with flexibility and be more resilient than a bright-line rule eliminating
certain claims from consideration); Sara E. Stratton, Note, Passwords Please: Rethinking the
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy in the Context of Social Media, 41 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 649, 677–78 (2014) (advocating a balancing test for resolution of informational privacy claims);
cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2032 (2010) (suggesting
that the basic question is whether the gravity of plaintiff’s privacy interest is “outweighed by a
paramount public policy interest”).
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For instance, Richard Turkington seemed to endorse a “flexible balancing
of interest approach.”215 Turkington critiqued a categorical approach
separating rights into those deemed fundamental and nonfundamental as
perpetuating “a rigid classification system” or “caste system of rights.”216
Instead, Turkington’s balancing approach involved two questions: first, an
examination of whether the information acquired was “intimate” or of a
“personal nature;” second, if so, it is weighed against the government’s
interest.217 In this way, Turkington recognized that certain types of
information are entitled to more protection than others, but nevertheless
advocated subjecting those privacy interests to a mere balancing test
(although he believed the balancing test had judicial teeth). Turkington
therefore seemed unable to escape what he labeled the “caste” system of
rights. For example, Turkington noted that medical information, such as a
person’s HIV status, has “special force” because of “both the intrinsic and
consequential features of such information.”218
Others have also noted the limitations of a balancing test, but their
proposed solutions have, thus far, fallen short. For example, Christina
Moniodis has contributed a powerful critique of those who have read the
Supreme Court’s informational privacy triad as endorsing a balancing
test.219 As she notes, informational privacy claims regularly raise an
“individual’s concern for the data in the abstract,” making it difficult for a
court to weigh the harm suffered by the plaintiff against a more concretely
articulated government interest.220 In lieu of balancing, Moniodis advocates
a “holistic analysis” that would empower courts to consider the context in
which a particular privacy challenge arises.221
Similarly, privacy expert Daniel Solove notes that, as currently
structured, balancing tests undervalue privacy.222 Solove continues to
believe that balancing is the correct approach, but suggests that courts will
be able to balance more effectively if they understand that privacy is not
just an individual right, but serves larger social values, such as its

215

Turkington, supra note 8, at 504.
Id.
217 Id. at 505, 508–09.
218 Id. at 511.
219 Christina P. Moniodis, Moving from Nixon to NASA: Privacy’s Second Strand—A Right to
Informational Privacy, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 139, 158–63 (2012).
220 Id. at 159.
221 Id. at 165–66.
222 SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 88 (“Balancing privacy against opposing interests has suffered from
systemic difficulties that often result in the undervaluation of privacy interests.”).
216
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contributions to democracy.223 I agree that privacy’s value is not limited to
its role as an individual right, and plays an important social role, and with
Moniodis that a broader view of the interests at play may be useful. But, I
remain skeptical that a shift in narrative from an emphasis on individual
rights to broader social rights (without a change in the structure of the test
itself) will overcome judicial deference to government decisions if the test
remains an open-ended flexible balancing approach.224
Instead, I advocate that the primary interests served by an
informational privacy right be given explicit, structural recognition within
the test itself, providing courts concrete guidance on informational
privacy’s true, underlying value. It is not clear how Solove’s or Moniodis’s
proffered solution would be much different in practice than the prevailing
balancing test or provide courts the kind of direct guidance necessary to
objectively evaluate privacy claims. Nor is it clear under Turkington’s
analysis why a categorical approach should not be implemented given that
different types of private information are seemingly more important. The
categorical approach advanced herein has the advantage of avoiding the
vagaries of a “flexible” balancing approach, and, in a more intellectually
direct way, explicitly recognizes that certain types of information (intimate
and political) are entitled to greater protection.225 The test then provides that

223 Id. at 89–93; SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 50–51 (2011) (concluding that when being balanced
against security interests, privacy must be understood as a “greater social good” and not just an
individual interest); see also PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY xv–xvi, 213 (1995) (“privacy is not only of value to the individual as an
individual but also to society in general”); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in
Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“information privacy should be viewed as a
societal value justifying a resolution in the public interest, much like environmental policy and other
societal concerns, with less emphasis on individual self-policing”).
224 While Solove’s august analysis acknowledges that broad conceptions of informational privacy
will prove of little practical use in enforcing privacy rights, part of his solution (which admittedly was
not uniquely focused on the constitutional informational privacy context) is to advance a pluralistic
conception of privacy that focuses on the different privacy “problems” raised by different surveillance,
aggregation, and information processing cases. SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 187–88. Solove’s taxonomy
involves sixteen different kinds of privacy problems. Id. at 10–11. Solove views this as a bottom-up,
pragmatic solution preferential to a one-size-fits-all approach. I concur that different types of privacy
problems require different approaches (much of this Article is focused on differentiating intrusion and
decisional concerns from informational concerns). But at times, Solove’s solution of flexibly focusing
on privacy problems to identify the determinative interests involved seems just as malleable as the
unstructured balancing test that he, too, critiques. My position is a relatively simple one: at least in the
constitutional context, courts need more concrete guidance instructing them that certain types of
information are entitled to heightened protection. Courts must triage different kinds of information. See
also M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133, 1142 (2011) (advancing
the need to set boundaries on privacy harms, and gently critiquing Solove’s approach as overly
pluralistic).
225 Kreimer, supra note 214, at 144 (suggesting that for certain types of information, balancing may
be unnecessary and, instead, constitutional bulwarks should be established, which provide shortcuts for
vindicating such claims without the need for ad hoc balancing).

199

SKINNER-THOMPSON (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/2015 11:07 AM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

greater protection in the form of strict scrutiny, whereas under the
prevailing status quo approach, all claims to informational privacy, even
those involving intimate or political information, are vulnerable as a result
of the “flexible” and unclear rule of law.226
A strict scrutiny test would also make it clear that certain categories of
information were entitled to constitutional protection, limiting the extent to
which qualified immunity could be invoked (as it frequently is) to bar
informational privacy claims based on the conclusion that the right is not
“clearly established.” Private suits for money damages against government
officials are one of the principal methods of enforcing the Constitution.227
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for such
suits if the officials’ conduct did not violate clearly established
constitutional or statutory rights “of which a reasonable person would have
known.”228 Despite the fact that many circuits have recognized—in broad
strokes—a right to informational privacy for nearly four decades,
defendants and courts still routinely invoke qualified immunity to defeat
informational privacy claims because the right’s contours remain illdefined.229 A firmly and clearly established judicial framework for
226

In contrast to the amorphous balancing test, a strict scrutiny test would streamline the analysis
and save the judiciary resources because in claims involving intimate or political information, courts
would not be bogged down comparing the unweighted factors, as criticized by Justice Scalia in Nelson.
131 S. Ct. 746, 768 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
227 As it stands, suits for money damages against state officials (authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983) or against federal officials (authorized in certain circumstances pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) are a key method of
constitutional enforcement. Cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 291 (1995) (questioning the need for statutory authorization for constitutional
enforcement); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 857, 915 (1999) (explaining that “rights and remedies in constitutional law are interdependent and
inextricably intertwined,” and observing, for example, that if qualified immunity were eliminated, “the
effect would be a wholesale rewriting of constitutional rights”).
228 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absent a more clearly defined informational
privacy right, qualified immunity will likely continue to delay the development of informational privacy
law in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Prior to Pearson, courts were required to first determine if the plaintiff had alleged or shown a violation
of a constitutional right and, if so, then determine whether that right was clearly established at the time
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Court required
that the merits of the constitutional claim be addressed first to prevent the stagnation of constitutional
rights. Id. But less than a decade later, in 2009, the Court in Pearson reversed itself and held that
judicial efficiency necessitated the relaxing of the Saucier two-step process, permitting courts to skip
over the first step of determining if a constitutional violation had been alleged. Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236. As long as courts skip over that crucial first step, the law on any given point will never become
clearly established, permitting government officials to avoid liability based on the murkiness of the law.
229 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2013) (granting defendant high
school coaches qualified immunity where they allegedly disclosed a student’s sexual orientation to the
student’s parents because the right to informational privacy was not clearly established). For additional
recent examples of cases invoking qualified immunity to deny informational privacy claims even
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evaluating informational privacy claims, such as the one advanced by this
Article, is necessary to avoid qualified immunity, be meaningful in
practice, and provide victims with redress.
C. Third-Party Exclusivity
In addition to the (over-) limiting effect of the balancing test and
qualified immunity, the third-party doctrine is often used to deny
informational privacy claims.230 The third-party doctrine—sometimes
referred to as the “secrecy” paradigm—requires that in order for
information to be entitled to protection from government surveillance or
dissemination, it must not have been previously shared with a third party.
The third-party doctrine is also a product of the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which only protects individuals from government searches
when they have a “legitimate expectation” of privacy.231 According to wellestablished formulations of the legitimate expectation test, an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is destroyed if they share the information
with a third party.232 The third-party doctrine relies on the false premise that
if a person shares intimate information with a closed, limited universe of
family and friends, the person has objectively manifested their indifference

concerning intimate information, see Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2011); Ismail v.
Fulkerson, No. SA CV 10-00901-VBF-AJW, 2014 WL 3962488, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014);
Ward v. Bolek, No. 3:12-cv-00136-SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25155, at *36–37 (D. Ore. Feb. 27,
2014); Hubacz v. Protzman, No. 2:12-cv-39, 2013 WL 1386287, at *8–9 (D. Vt. Apr. 4, 2013); and
O’Neill v. Bannister, No. 3:12-cv-00030-LRH (WGC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185433, at *9 (D. Nev.
Aug. 29, 2012).
230 See, e.g., Big Ridge, Inc., v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631, 652
(7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting informational privacy claim partly because medical records requested by the
government were no longer in the miners’ custody, but instead were in custody of their employers);
Kerns, 663 F.3d at 1187 (relying in part on third-party doctrine to deny informational privacy claim);
Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625–26 (8th Cir. 1996) (no right to privacy where information was
previously publicly available, notwithstanding that information should have previously been expunged);
Doe v. Lockwood, No. 95-3499, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19088, at *13–17 (6th Cir. June 27, 1996)
(informational privacy claim denied where HIV-positive plaintiff had previously disclosed his positive
status in court proceeding); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir.
1987) (rejecting informational privacy challenge to questionnaire regarding alcohol and gambling
habits, in part because those activities largely occur in public, and concluding that “[i]nformation
readily disclosed or available carries no protection”).
231 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (no legitimate expectation of Fourth
Amendment privacy where defendant deposited negotiable instruments with a bank); see also Nehf,
supra note 223, at 33–34 (cataloguing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize a privacy interest
when the information has been voluntarily provided to a third party, including through job applications
or through online searches).
232 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
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to further sharing of the information.233 Unfortunately, just as the Fourth
Amendment balancing test has influenced the development of
informational privacy law, the third-party doctrine, too, has infected
evaluation of informational privacy claims.234
The third-party doctrine has come under increasing scrutiny, even in
the Fourth Amendment context. As Laurent Sacharoff has explained,
ostensibly private information is rarely kept completely secret.235 Instead,
our expectation of privacy exists “in widening circles, expecting the least
privacy with respect to those to whom we are closest.”236 Solove has also
noted the third-party doctrine misapprehends the nature of the injury
caused by disclosure—“[t]he harm of disclosure is not so much the
elimination of secrecy as it is the spreading of information beyond expected
boundaries.”237 The third-party doctrine wrongly assumes that information
is either openly public or completely secret.238
Members of the Supreme Court likewise have signaled some
newfound reservations regarding the rigidity of the third-party doctrine. For
example, in United States v. Jones, the Court held that monitoring of a
vehicle via a law-enforcement-attached GPS tracking device constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment.239 As such, a warrant was required.240

233 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 101, 108 (explaining that the third-party doctrine relies on
the faulty reasoning that when one shares information with a friend, one assumes that it will be shared
freely and widely).
234 For examples, see supra note 230.
235 Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1270–
71 (2012).
236 Id. at 1271; see also Fried, supra note 38, at 483 (observing that there are “modulations” in both
the quantity and quality of information we share with different individuals and entities).
237 SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 145; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 63 (2000) (“[I]t makes no sense for the Court to say that when
I reveal private information in one context, I relinquish the right to conceal the same information in
other contexts.”).
238 See SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 150; see also Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for ThirdParty Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (“A
reconstituted third-party doctrine might recognize that some disclosures are made in confidence, that
there is value to such confidence, and that if the parties respect it, then the government should too.”); cf.
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32, 33 (2011)
(explaining that expectations regarding flows of information are context dependent); NISSENBAUM,
supra note 40, at 103–04 (focus on whether information has been shared in the “public” sphere is
insufficiently tuned to respond to realities of modern-day information flows). But see Parent, supra note
19, at 271 (arguing that dissemination of information regarding activities that occur in public domain,
such as gambling or drinking, cannot be described as privacy violations); Strandburg, Home, Home,
supra note 174, at 642 (agreeing that an aggressive application of the third-party doctrine makes little
sense when applied to technology-mediated communications, but observing that “courts are
increasingly disinclined to take a simplistic and aggressive third party doctrine approach”).
239 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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The U.S. Government had argued that because a vehicle’s movements are
exposed to the public, the third-party doctrine meant that the individual
being tracked by GPS had no reasonable expectation of privacy.241 In her
concurrence, Justice Sotomayor seemingly rejected this argument and
posited, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.”242 According to Justice Sotomayor, the thirdparty doctrine makes particularly little sense in a digital age, where people
disclose information about themselves online while performing now
routine, daily tasks.243
A formulation of informational privacy that is more divorced from the
Fourth Amendment and the “legitimate expectation of privacy test” would
also have the salutary effect of divorcing informational privacy from the
anachronistic third-party doctrine. Privacy claims would not be hamstrung
by concerns regarding whether the information was shared within a small
circle. By highlighting that intimate information and political thought are
almost de jure entitled to privacy protections absent a compelling interest
and narrowly tailored law, courts could largely sidestep the “legitimate
expectation” test and related third-party inquiry. A categorical emphasis on
intimate information and political thought would recognize that such
information is often but not always shared with other individuals. Sexuality
is rarely expressed or discussed in a vacuum. Nor is political dialogue. But
the mere fact that the information had been shared within a close circle
would not stymie informational privacy claims based on intimate
information or political thought because the individual’s legitimate
expectation or interest in that information is already acknowledged as
presumptively entitled to protection by the test.
This Part has demonstrated why a clear informational privacy
framework is a constitutional imperative. As outlined above, informational
240

See id.
Brief for the United States at 17–31, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 101259), 2011 WL 3561881, at *17–31.
242 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Grady v. North Carolina, No. 14593, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2015) (per curiam) (satellite-based monitoring of convicted sex
offender constitutes a Fourth Amendment search).
243 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (rejecting notion that merely because defendant shares information with an
accountant, the documents are committed to the public domain); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach,
443 S.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (plaintiff’s disclosure of his HIV status to family and
friends did not bar his privacy tort claim against television station that disclosed his medical status); cf.
Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (declaring
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment a search of hotel guest records, and narrowly interpreting
the third-party doctrine, concluding that the records were private), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015)
(affirming on narrow grounds).
241
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privacy threats continue to grow as a result of augmented powers from the
administrative state and technology. The rational-basis balancing test
employed by courts is insufficient to provide robust, meaningful protection
to informational privacy in the face of these growing threats. Informational
privacy’s precarious position is further exacerbated by the prevalence of
the third-party doctrine, built on the false premise that information shared
within circumscribed circles is automatically public information. I turn next
to a blueprint for an enforceable constitutional informational privacy right.
IV. THE UNCOVERED CONSTITUTIONAL BLUEPRINT
As it happens, not all types of information are created equal.244 By
acknowledging (and then following) this simple proposition, a more precise
and concrete theory of informational privacy that is conceptually
distinguishable from the Fourth Amendment and decisional privacy right
can take shape. This acknowledgment will also help courts move beyond
the dignity and autonomy myopia and give shape to an enforceable right to
informational privacy that safeguards the proffered right’s precise
underlying interests—the right to privacy over intimate information and
political thought. As this Part’s evaluation of precedent elucidates, there is
an undercurrent within informational privacy jurisprudence suggesting that,
normatively, both intimate information and information pertaining to
political thought are sui generis and should be subject to strict
constitutional protection under an informational privacy rubric. Doctrinally,
both categories are closely related to already-recognized fundamental
rights. Moreover, disclosure of intimate and political information is more
likely to result in tangible, negative downstream consequences in addition
to any intrinsic harm resulting from disclosure, heightening their normative
importance.245 In recognizing fundamental rights and subjecting them to
heightened scrutiny, courts have historically done so when such negative
downstream consequences would result absent constitutional protection.246

244 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POSTERA
6
(2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/
SNOWDEN
PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6TT-2W2W] (observing that “[d]ifferent
types of information elicit different levels of sensitivity among Americans”).
245 Cf. Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1161 (2015) (documenting that
laws designed to protect sensitive information do so because the information is believed to cause some
sufficiently high probability of harm if shared publicly; in other words, whether information causes
harm goes a long way in determining whether it is considered sensitive and entitled to protection under
regulatory frameworks).
246 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (highlighting the “far-reaching
consequences” of criminalizing sodomy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasizing in its
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Certain categories of information (intimate and political) are more likely to
result in negative downstream consequences (such as discrimination, stifled
political discourse, or marginalization) and, as such, are entitled to more
fundamental protection. In that sense, this Article’s categorical approach to
apprehending informational privacy’s true value finds support in
constitutional doctrine and is poised to harness underlying normative
judicial intuition.247
By focusing on intimate information, political thought, and the role of
downstream consequences, the framework is reflective of courts’ hunch
that these factors are of constitutional import.248 Viewed accordingly, the
Article is, in some ways, a simple exegesis of preexisting currents within
existing jurisprudence. The approach is not a departure from standard
modes of constitutional interpretation. Finally, by isolating these two
categories of information, this Article’s approach also shapes the right to
informational privacy as manageable and limited in scope, increasing its
likelihood of judicial acceptance, while decreasing the availability of the
qualified immunity defense.
A. Intimate Information
Intimate information is entitled to strict constitutional protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As used
here, intimate information includes highly personal information:
principally, sexual, medical, and mental health information.249

Due Process analysis that denying interracial couples the right to marriage denied a right fundamental to
“our very existence and survival” and resulted in discrimination).
247 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 (1930) (explaining that jurisprudence
and case law reflect judicial “hunches,” which in turn shape doctrine).
248 While I suggest that case law demonstrates the existence of a judicial hunch or intuition that
intimate information and political thought deserve greater constitutional protection, particularly when
coupled with downstream consequences, I am not making a reductive, cynical realist argument that this
“hunch” has resulted in a clear shift in doctrine based on what judges view, in their supposed
“unfettered” discretion, as right and wrong. Nor am I advocating that judges decide cases based purely
on their “hunches.” Cf. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 268 (1997) (critiquing as inaccurate the received view of realism as positing that
judges exercise unfettered discretion and use doctrine to after-the-fact rationalize their preconceived
beliefs). Quite the opposite. I believe the relatively widespread “hunch” supports the existence of a right
and serves as evidence of a constitutional norm in favor of intimate and political information, but that
courts have struggled to animate that hunch in their judicial decisions because of multiple doctrinal
barriers resulting from the imprecise focus on dignity and autonomy. In other words, one of the goals of
this Article is to provide a doctrinal solution or outlet for the normative judicial appetite in favor of
intimate information and political thought.
249 For a more detailed discussion regarding the definition of “intimate information,” see supra
note 7.
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Despite confusion regarding the existence of a right to informational
privacy and the right’s contours,250 the circuit courts have been most
sympathetic when claims implicate intimate information. For example,
several courts have recognized (at least rhetorically) that medical
information should be entitled to constitutional protection.251 Others have
specifically indicated that mental health information is protected.252 The
circuits have also widely recognized that sexual information, including but
not limited to information regarding an individual’s sexual orientation and
gender identity, is subject to constitutional safeguards.253 At a higher level
250

See supra Part II.
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 553 (9th Cir. 2004) (release of ultrasound
information “is obviously very sensitive”); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]here is a constitutional right to privacy that protects an individual from the disclosure of
information concerning a person’s health.”); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000)
(individuals have a “clearly established ‘substantial’ right in the confidentiality of medical
information”); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (reiterating interest in maintaining
privacy over health information such as one’s HIV status); Norman-Bloodshaw v. Lawrence Berkeley
Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (“One can think of few subject areas more personal and more
likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one’s health or genetic make-up.”); Eagle v. Morgan,
88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) (medical records fall within the category of “extremely personal”
information subject to constitutional protection); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir.
1994) (“[i]ndividuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to
privacy regarding their condition” as “there are few matters that are quite so personal as the status of
one’s health, and few matters the dissemination of which one would prefer to maintain greater control
over”); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1993) (“highly personal medical”
information is subject to constitutional protection); Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 795
(9th Cir. 1991) (“clear that medical information [including HIV status] was encompassed within the
first privacy interest related to disclosure of personal matters”); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 1987) (“we have repeatedly held that medical information . . .
is entitled to privacy protection against disclosure”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to
privacy protection.”). But see Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 261 (6th Cir. 2011) (no
constitutional violation where police department required employees to submit a doctor’s note
describing in general terms the nature of their illness upon return from sick leave).
252 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding no violation, but recognizing that a questionnaire “concerning an employees’ [sic] mental
health, on the other hand, may solicit highly personal information”).
253 Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that there is a “fundamental
right of privacy in one’s sexual life”); Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir.
2000) (“It is difficult to imagine a more private matter than one’s sexuality and a less likely probability
that the government would have a legitimate interest in disclosure of sexual identity. . . . [S]exual
orientation [is] an intimate aspect of [one’s] personality entitled to privacy protection . . . .”); Powell,
175 F.3d at 111 (“The excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons who
wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate.”); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685–86
(6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “a rape victim has a fundamental right of privacy in preventing
government officials from gratuitously and unnecessarily releasing the intimate details of the rape”
because “sexuality and choices about sex” are significant, intimate interests); ACLU v. Mississippi,
911 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “plaintiffs undeniably have an interest in restricting the
disclosure of” information pertaining to “allegations of homosexuality” and promiscuity); Eastwood v.
Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988) (“This constitutionally protected right [to
251
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of abstraction, there seems to be a growing consensus that “highly personal
information” is encompassed within the right to informational privacy.254
These decisions serve as evidence of a judicial intuition or undercurrent
that certain categories of intimate information normatively ought to be
entitled to robust constitutional protection. But notwithstanding their
instinct that intimate information is subject to heightened protection,
lacking a clear framework, circuit courts have frequently failed to actually
protect such information in their holdings.255
There are also hints within the Supreme Court’s informational privacy
trifecta that the Court may be prepared to acknowledge that certain types of
information are subject to more rigorous constitutional protection. For
example, in Nixon, the Court seemed to recognize—at least in the
abstract—that Nixon’s communications with his wife and physician were
of special importance, but concluded that the statutory safeguards in place
were sufficient.256 Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Nixon also provides
powerful support for distinguishing intimate information as constitutionally
protected. In concluding that the legislative scheme for perusing Nixon’s
papers did violate Nixon’s informational privacy rights, Burger highlighted
the personal nature of some of the documents to distinguish them from
other types of records, such as commercial records.257 Burger also noted
that when fundamental liberties were threatened, the burden was on the
Government to demonstrate that a compelling government interest was at

informational privacy] is implicated when an individual is forced to disclose information regarding
personal sexual matters.”); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (forcing a
police officer applicant “to disclose information regarding personal sexual matters” implicated her
constitutional right to privacy); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (“We cannot conceive
of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body.”). But see Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d
188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding no right to privacy in same-sex relations based on Bowers v.
Hardwick, which has since been repudiated by the Supreme Court).
254 Fraternal Order, 812 F.2d at 112–13 (“The more intimate or personal the information, the more
justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.”); Barry v. City of New York,
712 F.2d 1554, 1562 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that “highly personal” information is subject to
constitutional protection, in contrast to nonpersonal information).
255 See, e.g., Powell, 175 F.3d at 115 (finding that a right to informational privacy was not
sufficiently clearly established to defeat qualified immunity); Bloch, 156 F.3d at 686–87 (same); Doe v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1143 (3d Cir. 1995) (under a balancing test, no violation
where a public employee’s HIV status was disclosed to his government employer by a government
doctor); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 849 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that a right to informational
privacy was not sufficiently clearly established to defeat qualified immunity); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d
1080, 1089–90 (6th Cir. 1981) (rejecting a universal balancing approach to informational privacy in
favor of a case-by-case inquiry into whether the plaintiff claims a “fundamental” right); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–82 (3d Cir. 1980) (no informational privacy violation
notwithstanding recognition that medical records were sensitive , but remanding for further deliberation
into whether highly sensitive information might require protection).
256 433 U.S. 425, 459, 465 (1977).
257 Id. at 529 & n.27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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stake and that the legislation was “needed to achieve those goals.”258 ThenJustice Rehnquist echoed many of Burger’s concerns in a separate
dissent.259
Additionally, as discussed above, in Nelson the Court was very
attentive to the fact that intimate information—including mental health
information—was at issue.260 And as Jed Rubenfeld observed in the
decisional privacy context, courts seem more comfortable striking down
laws “under the rubric of privacy” when the laws concern sexuality,
broadly defined.261 Rubenfeld’s observation, made at a time when Bowers
v. Hardwick262 (sanctioning the criminalization of sodomy) was still good
law, is even more true today now that Lawrence v. Texas263 has overturned
Bowers.264
Outside the context of cases characterized as asserting informational
privacy claims, the Supreme Court has also signaled that intimate
information—as a category of information—is subject to greater
constitutional protection. For example, in Riley v. California, a Fourth
Amendment case involving the search of a cell phone incident to an arrest,
the Court recognized that “certain types of data are also qualitatively
different.”265 The principal example was that a cell phone could reveal that
a person had researched “certain symptoms of disease, coupled with

258

Id. at 527, 534.
Id. at 546–47 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
260 Supra text accompanying notes 126–34.
261 Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 738, 744; see also ROSEN, supra note 237, at 48 (“And sexual
identity is the most personal of all aspects of identity.”); Nehf, supra note 223, at 33 (noting that “courts
have occasionally found a constitutionally protected right to information privacy when the records
involve highly personal issues such as sexual practices or medical conditions”); Elbert Lin, Note,
Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1126
(2002) (observing that courts more routinely recognize a right to informational privacy when “intimate
or highly personal information” is at stake).
262 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
263 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
264 Philosopher Julie Inness has also suggested that intimacy is the touchstone of both the right to
informational and decisional privacy. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992).
But Inness’s definition of intimacy is probably too broad and too subjective to be functional. Inness’s
definition of what constitutes intimate information is determined almost purely subjectively by the
person asserting that the information is intimate, so long as the information derives its significance from
love, caring, or like. Id. at 87. As a matter of constitutional enforcement, such a broad and subjective
definition of intimacy would require courts to, in effect, police every state action for privacy
infringements.
265 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
259
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frequent visits to WebMD.”266 The Court also noted that a cell phone’s
“apps” could disclose information regarding a person’s romantic life and
alcohol or drug addictions.267 And as the Court’s decision in United States
v. Windsor illustrates, the Constitution protects individuals’ “moral and
sexual choices.”268 Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court
emphasized the importance of intimacy.269
Finally, while Congress’s attempts to enact privacy protections have
been piecemeal (and insufficient), the modern federal privacy statutes have
been largely influenced by concerns over “governmental collection and
abuse of intimate information.”270 As Paul Ohm has recently highlighted,
attempts to pass laws regulating and protecting what he calls “sensitive
information” have been much more successful than attempts to regulate
channels of communication, in part because sensitive information is both
narrower in scope and more emotionally salient to lawmakers.271 That
intimate information, as a category, ought to be entitled to protection is also
supported by common law invasion of privacy jurisprudence. Pursuant to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual is liable for public
disclosure of private facts if the publicized information “would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”272
Of course, the Supreme Court is not in the habit of impulsively
recognizing “new” fundamental constitutional rights under the Due Process

266 Id.; cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (in a First Amendment
challenge to a pharmaceutical marketing law, acknowledging that the government’s interest in
safeguarding medical privacy is significant).
267 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (noting that
historically, the curtilage surrounding a home has been constitutionally protected because “intimate
activity” is conducted therein (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
268 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). Although Windsor was at its core an equal protection case, the
Court’s analysis, at times, sounded in substantive due process.
269 Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571 and 14–574, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 26,
2015) (noting that the Due Process Clause protects “intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs”).
270 Murphy, supra note 202, at 495.
271 Ohm, supra note 245, at 1137–38. However, Ohm’s descriptive account of what constitutes
sensitive information is somewhat broader than what would be encompassed by this Article’s Due
Process protections for intimate and political information.
272 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Mark
Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information Privacy, 92 NEB. L. REV. 746, 772
(2014) (observing that tort law has taken a categorical approach to information privacy). For a
fascinating account of the relationship between privacy torts and constitutional privacy, and how the
two bodies of law could be merged, see Strahilevitz, supra note 214, at 2032–33. The growing number
of states with laws penalizing so-called revenge porn provides additional support for the norm against
disclosure of intimate information. For a list of such state laws, see 26 States Have Revenge Porn Laws,
END REVENGE PORN, http://www.endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [http://perma.cc/5MJK8TB4].
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Clause.273 Instead, the Court recognizes as fundamental those substantive
due process rights that have a foundation in the nation’s history and
tradition.274 That being said, the Court has been very clear that rights need
not be specifically delineated in the text of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to be considered fundamental.275 And as the Court held in
Obergefell, “[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline [the Due Process]
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history
and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.”276
Similarly, in Lawrence, when the Court struck down antisodomy laws as
violating Due Process, it held that:
[h]ad those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty
in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in
fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.277

Significantly, intimate information, as defined here, bears a striking
similarity to already recognized fundamental rights.278 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained, “we have held that . . . the ‘liberty’ specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, to have
children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to

273

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he Court has always been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”).
274 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly observed that
the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . . [and] we have required in substantive-dueprocess cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” (citations omitted));
see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 126.
275 Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Clauses
guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world.”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (2010) (“[N]obody should be surprised to find that the
Constitution protects rights that are not enumerated in it. Some of our most cherished rights (the right to
vote, the right to travel) have this status . . . . Even the most conservative jurists do not contest these
unenumerated rights.”).
276 Obergefell v. Hodges, Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571 and 14–574, slip. op. at 10–11 (U.S. June
26, 2015) (citation omitted).
277 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); see also Obergefell, slip. op. at 18 (suggesting that when matters
of intimacy, such as marriage, are involved, the Due Process analysis is even less stringent than outlined
in Glucksberg).
278 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 275, at 74 (“[T]here is a long tradition of recognizing, under the
Due Process Clause, a set of liberty interests in the area of intimate association.”).
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marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to
abortion.”279 The right to limit the government’s ability to disseminate and
collect sexual or medical information is closely related to the subject matter
of these fundamental rights. In order for many of these fundamental rights
to have real, practical meaning, as an antecedent right, privacy over
intimate information seems required. For example, the right to make
decisions about contraception use or engage in consensual sexual activity
will be of little use if the government is able to learn of and disseminate
information regarding that activity, policing one’s behavior.280
Accordingly, existing Supreme Court and circuit precedent implicitly
supports recognition of a fundamental right to limit collection and
dissemination of intimate information. The next step is for the courts to
make that underlying principle explicit.
Government imposition on fundamental rights is subject to strict
scrutiny,281 suggesting that, rather than a milquetoast balancing test,
heightened scrutiny is the proper standard of review for privacy claims
implicating intimate information.282 Skeptics of this position will be quick
to point out that the Court in Nelson seemed to suggest that strict scrutiny
was not appropriate. The Court “reject[ed] the argument that the
Government, when it requests job-related personal information in an
employment background check, has a constitutional burden to demonstrate
that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least restrictive means of furthering
its interests.”283 Importantly, the Court’s pronouncement was a limited
one—directed specifically to the context where the government is an
employer and has more latitude than when serving as regulator or
exercising police powers. Moreover, while the Court seems to reject the
second half of the strict scrutiny test analyzing the closeness of the
relationship between the Government’s objective and the means chosen for
achieving that objective, the Court notably did not hold that the
Government’s interest must be anything less than compelling. Put
279

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citations omitted).
Importantly, that the right to informational privacy may help give life to preexisting
fundamental rights does not mean that plaintiffs are required to show that, in fact, the government’s
actions did chill their activity. See supra Section IV.C.
281 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (The Due Process Clause “forbids the government to
infringe ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” (quoting Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))); cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (if
government action infringes on fundamental rights, it is subject to “more exacting judicial scrutiny”).
282 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Broad dissemination
by state officials of [medical] information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected
privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests.”).
283 131 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2011).
280
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succinctly, NASA v. Nelson does not wholesale reject strict scrutiny for
informational privacy claims. Conversely, as noted earlier, some circuits
have concluded that strict scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of
review for informational privacy claims.284
While there is a general aversion to applying strict scrutiny,285 it is
important to recognize that the right advanced herein is a very narrow one
that has been carefully described, keeping with the Supreme Court’s
preferences when recognizing fundamental rights.286 Not all information
implicates a fundamental right. Not all information is entitled to strict
scrutiny. To the extent that information falls outside these narrow
categories, the government action is subject to less rigorous review. As is
stands, only intimate information and, as discussed in the following section,
political thought, are fundamental and entitled to strict scrutiny.287
B. Political Thought
Like intimate information, data pertaining to political thought
(including religious thought) is subject to strict, constitutional protection.
The fundamental value of political information is evinced by the history
and very purpose of the Constitution, circuit precedent directly addressing
informational privacy claims, and related First Amendment precedent.
A key goal of the Constitution, and the Revolution that preceded it,
was ensuring a pluralistic political process. Any constitutional right to
privacy must be viewed through this history. As others have noted, one of
informational privacy’s principal values is in creating space for
countermajoritarian ideas to take seed, ensuring a fruitful marketplace of

284 Supra note 144; see also SAMAR, supra note 62, at 185 (explaining that Nixon may be
consistent with requiring informational privacy violations to be justified by a compelling state interest).
285 While it is true that in recent years the Court seems less eager to describe its constitutional
analysis in terms of the rigid three-tier levels of scrutiny, see, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), the Court has not rejected the three-tier heuristic and, at the very least, it remains a useful
shorthand for describing when a right is entitled to more rigorous protection.
286 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
287 Importantly, a robust but narrow informational privacy right focused on intimate information
may be a partial doctrinal solution to Mary Dunlap’s call for a “right to be sexual,” see Mary Dunlap,
Toward Recognition of “A Right to Be Sexual,” 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 245 (1982), as well as Martha
Nussbaum’s concern that Lawrence’s protection for sodomy is confined to certain spatial zones, such as
the home, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 275, at 89. A right to privacy over intimate information would
create freedom for private, sexual expression, and that activity, and information regarding that activity,
would not need to be confined to the home (although, admittedly the right to informational privacy
would not necessarily create space for all forms of public sexual expression). Similarly, a right to
privacy over intimate information would provide employees with a doctrinal response to government
attempts to learn of and regulate their sexual conduct through, for example, employee codes of conduct.
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ideas and a democratic society.288 The Constitution of the United States
itself was drafted and discussed in a closed-door meeting in Philadelphia,
illustrating the importance of informational privacy to the democratic
process, a point powerfully made by Alan Westin.289
Other scholars have also observed the relationship between
informational privacy, freedom of thought, and democracy,290 though fewer
have been focused on doctrinal solutions. For example, in a recent article,
Neil Richards argues that information-gathering programs threaten what he
calls “intellectual privacy” and “chills the exercise of vital civil liberties.”291
In the same vein, Cornel West has documented how the “tightening of
surveillance” in America and the corresponding “loosening of legal
protection” pose a threat to our democratic foundation.292 Julie Cohen, too,
has persuasively observed that freedom from surveillance is critical to
dynamic self-determination and, in turn, reflective citizenship and
democratic innovation.293
Recognition that informational privacy plays an important role in
preserving the structure of our democracy, and accordingly, that privacy of
political discourse and thought is of constitutional relevance, is not limited
288 Gavison, supra note 16, at 456 (“[I]ndividuals must have the right to keep private their votes,
their political discussions, and their associations if they are to be able to exercise their liberty to the
fullest extent. . . . Denying the privacy necessary for these interactions would undermine the democratic
process.”); Nehf, supra note 223, at 69 (informational privacy “is necessary to the proper functioning of
a democratic political system”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1651–53 (1999) (without informational privacy protections, the democratic potential of
the Internet will be quashed).
289 WESTIN, supra note 58, at 46–47.
290 Sklansky, supra note 50, at 1094–1101 (cataloguing other scholars who have noted the
relationship between informational privacy and democracy).
291 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945 (2013). As
Richards nicely describes,
Intellectual-privacy theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the intense
scrutiny of public exposure; that people should be able to make up their minds at times and places
of their own choosing; and that a meaningful guarantee of privacy—protection from surveillance
or interference—is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom. It rests on the idea that
free minds are the foundation of a free society, and that surveillance of the activities of belief
formation and idea generation can affect those activities profoundly and for the worse.
Id. at 1945–46; see also Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408–24 (2008)
(observing the relationship between intellectual privacy and freedom of thought).
292 CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM 6–7
(2004).
293 Cohen, supra note 18, at 1905 (“[F]reedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is
foundational to the practice of informed and reflective citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable
structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.”); Cohen, supra note 65, at 1425 (“The
recognition that anonymity shelters constitutionally-protected decisions about speech, belief, and
political and intellectual association—decisions that otherwise might be chilled by unpopularity or
simple difference—is part of our constitutional tradition.”); see also SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 149
(“Government information gathering can make people reticent to read controversial books or
investigate unpopular viewpoints.”)
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to scholarly, historical descriptions. The Supreme Court has also
highlighted the important role privacy plays in advancing political thought.
For example, in Riley, mentioned previously, the Court highlighted that
political information and thought were of heightened importance, observing
that warrantless cell phone searches were prohibited because cell phones
contained political information revealing whether the person looked “for
Democratic Party news and Republican Party news.”294
Circuit courts that have addressed informational privacy claims
touching on political thought have also emphasized its constitutional
importance. For example, in ACLU v. Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the constitutional right to informational privacy restricted
the state’s ability to publicly disclose files from the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission, the state’s disbanded secret intelligence arm
previously committed to perpetuating racial segregation.295 Because the
Commission reports included documentation of “extreme political and
religious views” and other sensitive information, the Court reasoned that
the “plaintiffs undeniably have an interest in restricting the disclosure of”
that information and vacated the district court’s order publicly releasing the
files without restriction.296
In addition to the fact that the nation’s history and tradition indicate
that protection of political thought is one of the fundamental interests
served by an informational privacy right, protection of political thought
information is also supported by First Amendment jurisprudence.
Beginning with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court
has held that organizations cannot, absent a compelling government
interest, be forced to disclose their membership.297 In concluding that
294 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Jeffrey Rosen has offered a slightly different
but also apt democracy-oriented justification for privacy that also connects the protection of intimate
information with democracy promotion. According to Rosen, ensuring that individuals’ intimate
information is given privacy protection frees the public sphere for more important, civic-focused
discussions. ROSEN, supra note 237, at 140.
295
911 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1990).
296 Id. at 1070, 1075.
297 357 U.S. 449, 463–66 (1958); cf. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (collecting
authority and concluding that disclosure requirements within the electoral context are subject to
“exacting scrutiny”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 712–13 (2010) (refusing to permit even
limited broadcast of the Proposition 8 trial in part because witnesses’ politically charged views would
be disseminated); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198–99 (1957) (limiting power of the Committee on Un-American
Activities to conduct investigations because the judiciary must not abdicate its constitutional
responsibility “to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s right to
privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly”).
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forced disclosure of private membership lists is “subject to the closest
scrutiny,” the Court has noted the link between private points of view,
freedom of expression, and democratic governance.298 This First
Amendment right to limit the government’s ability to disclose one’s
membership in a political organization directly supports a due process right
to limit the government’s ability to collect and disseminate one’s political
thoughts.299 Of course, membership in an organization is but one way that
private, political thoughts may be expressed.300 It is certainly not the only
way. And the Court’s predilection for protecting the privacy of political
association (and freedom of expression more broadly) logically directly
extends to protection of private political thought,301 even if not expressed
via associational membership.302 In addition, the First Amendment’s
heightened protection for free expression of religion provides additional
doctrinal support for viewing political and religious thought as subject to
strict constitutional privacy protections.303
298 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–62 (holding that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” that “[i]t
is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of belies and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause,” and that there is a “vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations”); see also Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that one
potential reading of Whalen is that the Constitution limits disclosure where it threatens particularized
rights “such as the associational rights protected by the First Amendment”); Anita L. Allen,
Associational Privacy and the First Amendment: NAACP v. Alabama, Privacy and Data Protection,
1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (associational privacy “minimizes the risk of stigma or reprisal
flowing from group membership”).
299 MILLER, supra note 32, at 199 (suggesting that First Amendment protections for freedom of
association could provide the basis for a right to informational privacy).
300 Justice Brandeis insightfully recognized that private political thought served as a foundation for
political speech and action many years ago. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our independence believed . . . . that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth . . . and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.”).
301 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management”
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1006–07 (1996) (explaining that “[t]houghts and opinions,
which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum” and that “[i]t is this iterative process of
‘speech-formation’—which determines, ultimately, both the content of one’s speech and the particular
viewpoint one espouses—that the First Amendment should shield from scrutiny”); Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, supra note 291, at 403 (arguing that intellectual privacy, or privacy of thought, is
an important First Amendment value).
302 Similarly, to the extent that the Constitution protects the fundamental right to vote, those
protections also support a right to informational privacy over political thought. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (declaring the right to vote a “fundamental political right”).
303 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (a law,
which burdens religious practice and is not of general applicability, must meet strict scrutiny).
Katherine Strandburg has made a similar but distinct argument, compellingly suggesting that the First
Amendment freedom of association—by itself and without aid of the Due Process Clause—can serve as
a strict scrutiny limitation on government surveillance of networks. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom
of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C.
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In sum, undercurrents within informational privacy jurisprudence,
supported by First Amendment authority, suggest that information
pertaining to political thought is subject to heightened protection under the
Due Process Clause.304
C. Downstream Consequences
At various points, this Article argues that downstream consequences
play a role in establishing the normative value of intimate information and
political thought and in influencing judicial evaluation of informational
privacy claims. Let me be clear about what that role is. First, I am not
suggesting that to state a claim a plaintiff must plead or prove that the
collection and dissemination of information caused a concrete, economic or
physical harm.305 Rather, my claim regarding judicial decisionmaking,
based on a review of informational privacy jurisprudence, is that
informational privacy claims are more likely to prevail when the plaintiff
can show that there are such downstream consequences to information
collection or dissemination.306 In this way, while the presence or absence of
L. REV. 741, 794−97 (2008). To the extent Strandburg broadly conceives of what it means to be
“associated” with someone else, and thus broadly conceives of the First Amendment’s application, her
position supports, rather than detracts from, the position advanced here that the First Amendment
buttresses a due process informational privacy right in political thought and communication.
Strandburg’s First Amendment relational surveillance paradigm and my informational privacy
framework are reinforcing, rather than conflicting. However, a purely First Amendment approach is
perhaps too narrow in that it may not squarely protect intimate information.
304 If intimate and political information is subject to strict constitutional protection, what is
excluded? One prominent example would be financial information. Financial information does not bear
a close relationship to already existing constitutional rights. Moreover, in contrast to intimate
information and political thought, courts have rather routinely minimized the privacy interests affected
by financial disclosure laws—that is, there is not as robust of a social or judicial undercurrent
recognizing that financial information is of such constitutional importance to warrant heightened
scrutiny. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1987)
(certain financial information may be less intimate than medical information); Duplantier v. United
States, 606 F.2d 654, 671 (5th Cir. 1979) (financial information “has received little constitutional
protection” (quoting O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976))); see also Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 174–76 (1911) (Fourth Amendment did not prohibit public inspection of tax
returns as means of ensuring “fullness and accuracy” of corporate tax returns). With time, attitudes
toward financial information may change, particularly as abuse of others’ financial information grows.
305 Nothing in the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence suggests that a plaintiff must plead such
an injury to satisfy Article III standing. Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1154–55
(2013) (concluding that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge certain provisions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act because they could not demonstrate that they have been surveilled, but
suggesting that if they had evidence they had been surveilled, they would satisfy Article III standing
requirements); see also Scott G. Thompson & Christopher Klimmek, Tenth Amendment Challenges
After Bond v. United States, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 995, 997–98 (2012) (outlining Article III standing
requirements).
306 Ann Bartow has also suggested that emphasizing more tangible harms is important to
successfully vindicating privacy rights. Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy
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downstream consequences has a limiting effect on the right to
informational privacy, the absence of such harms is not necessarily and
should not be a per se bar.307
How, then, do downstream consequences interact with the two
categories of information subject to strict scrutiny and help establish their
normative import as the values underlying informational privacy? This is
the second point. Intimate information and political thought are the values
underlying an informational privacy right (and are entitled to strict
scrutiny) in part because they are likely to result in negative downstream
consequences, such as discrimination, marginalization, or even violence.308
The presence or absence of downstream consequences appears to have
a significant impact on judicial appetite for privacy claims.309 The Second
Circuit’s decision in Powell v. Schriver310 is a good example. There, a
prison guard disclosed that a particular inmate was HIV-positive and had
undergone a “sex-change operation” to other inmates and guards.311 In
concluding that the inmate did have a constitutional right to privacy over
this information—even in the prison setting—the court emphasized that
disclosing the information exposed the inmate to potential discrimination
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 61–62 (2006); cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”); JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 408 (1949) (“However much
the letter law extends its precedents, however much the statute law may seek to make the standards of
law concrete and definite, there is an instinct in the soul of man which bids him look, not to the
unending scrolls of the law, but to” one’s sense of justice.).
307 Cf. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 30 (arguing that “demanding more palpable” privacy harms may
be problematic); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 364 (2014)
(arguing that privacy victims should not be required “to move theoretical or evidentiary mountains
before they see recovery”).
308 GRANT ET AL., supra note 82; Mottet, supra note 183; Spade, supra note 186; SkinnerThompson & Richardson, supra note 85, at 14-5 (discussing prison violence against inmates known to
have HIV).
309 See supra note 171 (cataloguing circuit court informational privacy cases emphasizing
downstream harms); cf. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2000)
(granting relief in an informational privacy claim that was preceded by the privacy victim’s death).
Moreover, while not controlling in the privacy context (i.e., where the government discloses true but
sensitive information), in the defamation context (where the government espouses false information),
the Supreme Court has held that to state a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must allege more
than mere reputational damages, and must allege so-called stigma-plus. The “plus” may include, for
example, loss of a government job following the defamation. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11
(1976). The stigma-plus requirement in the defamation context signals the importance of downstream
consequences to the Court. For an important critique of the stigma-plus doctrine, see Eric J. Mitnick,
Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79
(2009).
310 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
311 Id. at 109. An increasingly preferred term today is “gender confirmation surgery.” See Loren S.
Schechter, ‘Gender Confirmation Surgery’: What’s in a Name?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2012,
5:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/loren-s-schechter-md-facs/gender-confirmationsurgery_b_1442262.html [http://perma.cc/8LMC-G7C3].
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and harassment.312 The court observed that the potential for such
downstream discrimination was “obvious” when dealing with intimate
information such as one’s HIV status or gender identity.313 Conversely, in
cases such as Nixon, where the former President was unable to articulate a
downstream harm to having his voluminous papers reviewed where
personal papers were segregated from publication, courts have been
reluctant to find informational privacy violations.314 Similarly, in Nelson,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the responses to the employment
questionnaires could not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding,
mitigating any downstream harm.315
Judicial emphasis on the presence of downstream consequences in
privacy cases has occurred in other contexts as well. For example, in
Lawrence, the Court emphasized that the proscription of sodomy did much
more than prohibit a specific sex act, but instead had “more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior.”316 The importance of downstream consequences is also
consistent with the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence
suggesting that vulnerable groups are entitled to enhanced protection. In
Windsor, the Supreme Court emphasized that laws that impose a legal
disability on vulnerable groups are constitutionally suspect.317
The saliency of downstream harms is, in a way, corollary to the
analysis indicating that courts, outside of the Fourth Amendment intrusion
context, are unable to see the connection between informational privacy
claims and dignity harms.318 Absent direct, forceful government searches,
courts expect more than an injury to mere dignity. They expect a
downstream harm. That harm is often inherently and palpably present in
312

Powell, 175 F.3d at 111–12.
Id. The fact that the court in Powell ultimately denied the claim based on qualified immunity,
id. at 114, highlights the need for the clear doctrinal framework outlined in this Article.
314 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (privacy claim “cannot be considered in the abstract”).
315 131 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2011).
316
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). See Nehf, supra note 223, at 26 (“The more cognizable and
immediate problem with a loss of information privacy, and the problem that is most likely to produce a
political resolution, is our inability to avoid circumstances in which others control information that can
affect us in material ways—whether we get a job, become licensed to practice in a profession, obtain a
critical loan, or fall victim to identity theft.”); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 712–13
(2010) (prohibiting limited broadcast of Proposition 8 trial because witnesses could be subject to
harassment as a result of the broadcast of their testimony).
317 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)
(emphasizing the “immediate, continuing and real injuries” inflicted on LGBT individuals); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“mere negative attitudes, or fear . . . are
not permissible bases” for differential treatment).
318 Supra Section I.A.
313
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cases involving disclosure of intimate information and political thought.
This Article’s framework recognizes that reality and provides courts a clear
course to follow in adjudicating informational privacy claims.
D. In Defense of a Categorical Approach
Before closing, it is necessary to respond to critiques of categorical
approaches to privacy. Of note, Jeffrey Rosen has suggested that isolating
certain types of information as protected should not be the principal regard
of a privacy regime.319 As a hypothetical, he compares the harm of a school
monitoring a student’s music downloads and discovering that the student
liked Richard Wagner to being seen by a classmate waiting in line to listen
to Wagner at the opera.320 According to Rosen, the monitoring is an
indignity while bumping into the classmate is an “embarrassment but not
injury to privacy and dignity” because the student was caught in plain
view.321
This hypothetical is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, by
employing a relatively benign example, it trivializes the possibility that
certain types of information may be more important than others. Privacy
violations revealing details of a sexual assault, a person’s HIV status, or
planned political opposition simply are not on the same level as the
revelation of one’s music preferences. Informational privacy case law
discursively reflects that reality,322 but until this point courts have lacked
the doctrinal framework to give that reality consistent meaning in the
context of case adjudication. Second, by focusing on control and “plain
view,” Rosen, perhaps unintentionally, reifies the third-party doctrine. By
forthrightly recognizing that certain types of information are entitled to
more protection than other types regardless of whether they have been
shared within a confined circle, the framework I advance could chip away
at the flawed third-party doctrine, which presumes that personal
information is only entitled to protection if it has been kept completely
secret.
Others may be concerned that any attempt to define categories of
information deserving special consideration is insufficiently flexible to deal
with modern-day privacy problems, may leave significant gaps, and
319 Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2121 (2001). That
being said, elsewhere Rosen seems to suggest that intimate information is of special importance. See
supra note 261.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 See supra Sections IV.A–B; see also Henkin, supra note 211, at 1429 (foreseeing a categorical
approach to decisional privacy).
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instead, a contextual approach to privacy claims ought to be adopted.323
While I am sympathetic to concerns of creating privacy gaps, at least in the
constitutional arena, the structural playing field is currently tilted far away
from privacy interests (as outlined in Part II), causing privacy interests to
be routinely undervalued.324 As such, privacy concerns should be triaged to
put the constitutional right to informational privacy on firmer normative
and doctrinal ground, with future gap-filling embellishments potentially to
follow. In other words, a categorical approach at least gets informational
privacy’s foot in the constitutional door. Moreover, some gaps may, in fact,
be warranted—again, at least with regard to constitutional privacy. That is
to say that when confronting a constitution of limited rights, there are
bound to be certain gaps. As outlined above, the categories of information
identified herein as entitled to enhanced constitutional protection have the
virtue of being supported by constitutional provisions and precedent; it is
not clear that can be said for all types of information.
What is more, this Article’s approach is consistent with a contextual
approach to privacy, such as that insightfully advanced by Helen
Nissenbaum.325 A categorical approach privileging certain subject matters
as deserving special treatment merely helps us identify the contexts where
privacy is entitled to meaningful protection.326
Nor does this Article’s approach completely ignore that there may be
certain contexts in which the government does have legitimate reasons for
collecting, or even disseminating, certain data. The government is faced
with immense challenges and one can easily imagine circumstances where
it might actually be compellingly important for the government and, for
example, the transgender community to know how many people identify as
transgender. For instance, if treatment for transgender-related medical care
becomes increasingly covered by government-sponsored health
insurance,327 it might be beneficial to ascertain for actuarial or budgetary
purposes the number of transgender people that will require coverage.
Rather, a categorical approach suggests that when dealing with intimate or
political information, the government’s needs must be compelling and the
323 See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 40, at 232 (suggesting that efforts “to define a category of
sensitive information deserving special consideration” be laid to rest).
324 See supra Section III.B.
325 See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 40 (advancing theory of contextual integrity).
326 Cf. Ohm, supra note 245, at 1145–46 (observing that attempts to identify certain categories of
sensitive information are not necessarily in conflict with Nissenbaum’s contextual approach).
327 See Nat’l Convergence Determination 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, Decision No. 2576, Docket
No. A-13-87, (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. May 30, 2014) (lifting ban on Medicare coverage for
gender confirmation surgery).
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means must be narrowly tailored. It does not, in fact, paralyze government
action, but alters the playing field for when context is ultimately considered
by courts.
Finally, there may also be apprehension that a categorical approach
privileging intimate and political information, but not, for example,
financial information, may not be an effective tool to limit wide sweeping
government surveillance programs, such as NSA programs that do not
exclusively target intimate information (arguably such programs do target
political information). Not necessarily so. If the government’s broad
collection or dissemination includes the intimate information or political
information of certain individuals, then those individuals would
presumably have a cause of action—and one with teeth: strict scrutiny. The
fact that some, but not all, of the people observed by the surveillance
program may not have robust causes of action does not make the
informational privacy claim a less effective means of private regulation of
government surveillance. As in the First Amendment speech context, the
Supreme Court has recognized that where laws prohibit both protected and
unprotected speech, they are overbroad and constitutionally
impermissible.328 Here, too, if a surveillance regime infringes on intimate
information or political thought, in addition to nonprotected information, it
could be deemed constitutionally overbroad.329
CONCLUSION
As outlined in this Article, moving beyond dignity and autonomy and
reorienting the right to informational privacy toward those categories of
information of paramount importance not only more precisely captures the
underlying normative value of an informational right, but could also
increase judicial recognition of the right. By centering intimate information
and political thought and demonstrating their close relationships to other
fundamental rights, this Article may help move the judicial needle toward
robust, heightened judicial protection for intimate and political information,
328 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (statute that criminalized the creation,
sale, or purchase of depictions of animal cruelty was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First
Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397–98 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
judgment) (law that “criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the First
Amendment” is unconstitutional).
329 Where secret surveillance programs are involved, learning that a plaintiff’s intimate or political
information has been gathered may be difficult and pose an obstacle under the Supreme Court’s narrow
standing jurisprudence. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1179 (2008). The problem of standing is beyond the scope of this Article, but has been the subject of
important critique. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,”
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1059 (2008) (examining whether the decision in ACLU v. NSA was
“substance disguised as process”).
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preventing (among other things) the forced outing of LGBTQ individuals
and individuals living with HIV by the government.
Consistent with this Article’s conceptual reorientation to the confusion
over informational privacy, the Supreme Court seems comfortable with a
categorical approach to the right to privacy.330 Bifurcation of rights into
those that are fundamental and nonfundamental is almost by definition a
categorical approach. The categories, of course, have limitations and
exclude vigorous constitutional protection for certain activities. But it is
preferential (and at the very least strategic) to harness those categories in
the interest of protecting various, private activities, as opposed to the
continued efforts to protect informational privacy through visionary but
imprecise dignity or autonomy conceptualizations.

330 Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 751 n.83 (“The Court has repeatedly made clear that some
criterion, imperfectly defined as yet, of ‘fundamentality’ must be present in the conduct at issue before
the right of privacy will apply.”); cf. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and
Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 405–06 (2009) (the Supreme Court has embraced
a categorical approach protecting certain arms and individuals from regulation under the Second
Amendment).
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